Testing for East-West Similarities:

Determinants of Support for European Integration within the EU-25[∇]

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether the patterns of support for European integration found within the EU-15 member states are replicated in the new members states of Central and Eastern Europe i.e., whether a generalised theory of support for European integration can be formulated. Using the 2003 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey and the 2000 Standard Eurobarometer survey from the EU-15 members, it empirically tests seven key hypotheses that were developed to explain patterns of support within the EU. The results suggest that despite different historical, social, religious norms and communist legacies, the determinants of support for European integration are almost identical in the new and old member states. The surveys are then pooled and a test of all seven hypotheses reveals that the support for European integration is founded on utilitarian considerations, political motivation, and to a lesser extent, on cognitive mobilisation, in an EU of 25 members.

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1. Introduction

The creation and expansion of the European Union over the last 47 years has largely been an elite driven process. However, the desire for deeper integration, most notably the inception of the Single Market, the Schengen zone without border controls, the introduction of the Euro, and the subsequent need to ratify treaties by means of referenda, has forced the public to become more concerned with European affairs. The EU has experienced more referenda since 1990 than the previous three decades of its existence (10 between 1972-1989 and 29 between 1990-2004). The fate of further integration, therefore, has been transferred into the hands of the European public, and to date, they have often used this power to ground integration to a halt (e.g., the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Irish failure to ratify the Nice Treaty in 2001 – though both decisions were eventually reversed). To account for the varying levels of support for the EU among the European public, a plethora of studies have evolved (Handley, 1981; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif, 1991; Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien, 1994; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Franklin, Van der Eijk, and Marsh, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998). A number of hypotheses have thus emerged, emphasising the importance of economic factors, domestic politics and social values in determining support for European integration.

Parallel to these studies, research focusing on the determinants of support for EU membership in Central and Eastern Europe has materialized in recent years. As seen in several studies which have analysed support for membership in the candidate countries (e.g., Cichowski, 2000; Ehin, 2001; Tucker, Pacek and Berlinsky, 2002; Markowski and Tucker, 2003; Tverdova and Anderson, 2003; Slomczynski and Shabad, 2003; Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2004), the public's support for EU membership is essentially an extension of their experiences of the transition process, whereby those who benefited from the reform process also support the ultimate economic reform, i.e., becoming a member of the European Union. While the determinants of support for European integration in the EU-15 members have been divided into several testable hypotheses, research conducted on the Central and Eastern Europe countries has been more fragmented. The majority of studies have concentrated on the importance of the post-communist experiences in determining attitudes towards European integration rather than explicitly testing the established theories of support

for EU integration. This exercise was essential in order to understand how the communist period (during which time these countries were members of the Soviet block or, as in the case of the Baltic countries, integral parts of the Soviet Union) influenced attitudes towards relinquishing recently attained independence to join the European Union. However, given that eight post-communist countries have now become members of the EU to form an union of 25 states (increasing the size of the European population by 20%, from 380.8 million to 454.9 million), it is now appropriate to unite these two evolving literatures in order to, first, analyse whether the determinants of support in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe replicate the findings from Western Europe, and second, to determine which overall theory of support predominates in the new enlarged Union.

Theories regarding support for European integration are centred on three major themes: Cognitive Mobilization hypotheses (emphasizing the importance of knowledge and information), Utilitarian hypotheses (focusing on economic concerns and welfare gains) and Political Motivation hypotheses (considering political values and partisanship). One may expect that different hypotheses may hold relevance in the "old" and "new" member states[1] given their unique historical, economic, political and social experiences. For example, different hypotheses may hold for countries which have had longer experiences of being members of the EU, than for those countries that have recently become members or have yet to join. In regards the cognitive mobilisation hypothesis, one may expect the old members to have more knowledge of the EU and its institutions than the new members, given that they have been exposed to information concerning the EU through media debates, referendum campaigns and holding the rotating EU presidencies and summits, throughout the history of their membership. The new and old members may also diverge in regards the utilitarian motivations of support. While the old members can use retrospective evaluations that encompass previous benefits of membership to form prospective expectations about the future, the new members have no such reference point, and cannot extrapolate from past experiences. Therefore, their attitudes about being a member of the

[1] The "old" members in this study refer to the 15 member states before the latest enlargement: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. The "new" members in this study are the 10 new member states that joined the EU on May 1st 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as Bulgaria and Romania which are scheduled to join in 2007, and Turkey which currently has no scheduled accession date.

European Union are likely to be forward looking and based on expectations about the future benefits of membership. In addition, the new and old members may diverge in regards the political determinants of support. While the political system in Western Europe is firmly established and stable, the corresponding system in Central and Eastern Europe is still evolving and fragmented. Given that the extent of individual party identification is still quite low, one may question whether voters in the new member states will follow cues from either their incumbent government or their preferred political party, when forming opinions about the EU.

Finally, the main factor which sets the countries of Central and Eastern Europe apart from their Western counterparts is their legacy of communism, which not only implemented structural transformations, but also espoused very different ideas and beliefs, and hence may influence the formation of attitudes in the post-communist era. This paper attempts to uncover such potential discrepancies among the determinants of support for European integration in the EU-15 and new members states. The implications of this research are potentially far reaching, as by finding how similar the old and new members are, it indicates the extent to which the newcomers are mature and prepared for membership in the European Union, and in turn, how fragmented or cohesive the enlarged EU will be in the coming years. In other words, the underlying question of this analysis is: are we faced with a prospect of one Europe, or two?

This paper thus investigates whether a generalised theory of support for European integration can be formulated. Similar to Gabel's (1998) study testing five theories of support for European integration, this paper moves away from the anecdotal and event-specific explanations of support which has driven the current candidate country literature, towards performing a rigorous empirical investigation of the determinants of support for integration in both the old and new member states. This approach therefore develops previous literature in several ways. First, it offers a comprehensive assessment and testing of seven central hypotheses on public support for European integration. The majority of studies to date that examine this issue restrict their analysis to one or two hypotheses without controlling for additional factors that may also, either directly or indirectly, influence support for integration. Therefore, in addition to testing each hypothesis separately, while controlling for standard socio-economic variables, this study also assesses how the various hypotheses fare when

tested jointly. Second, the empirical analysis is performed using the most up-to-date survey data available covering 28 European countries (25 current member states and 3 potential members). Previous studies examining support for enlargement in the candidate countries rely on survey data from 1996 or earlier, when European issues were not as salient nor was the prospect of EU membership as tangible as in the more recent past. By utilising survey data from 2000 and 2003 it is possible to assess the determinants of support for EU membership while the referenda on membership were taking place and the process of further EU integration was already underway (see Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2004). In addition, selecting common questions from both the Eurobarometer and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys enables the testing of analogous hypotheses in both the EU-15 states and the new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, this study also presents the first empirical study that includes all 25 members in the newly enlarged Union

The paper progresses as follows: section 2 discusses each of the main hypotheses, developed to explain the determinants of support for integration in the EU-15 member states. Section 3 then reviews the current literature on support for European integration within the new members. Following this, section 4 formulates the hypotheses to be tested and section 5 discusses the data used and methodology employed. Section 6 presents the empirical results for both the Eurobarometer and Candidate Country Eurobarometer surveys. Section 7 empirically tests all seven hypotheses of support using the pooled EU-28 dataset. Finally, section 8 discusses the main implications of the findings.

2. Theories of Support for European Integration

The literature concerning the determinants of support for European integration is almost as old and established as the Union itself, with the first empirical analysis emerging after 1973 when the European Commission introduced the Eurobarometer opinion poll series. Since then, this survey has been carried out in all member states at 6-month intervals. The existence of such extensive information allowed researchers to test the hypotheses that evolved in the 1960's and 1970's to explain public support for European integration. A plethora of studies thus ensued. The main findings of this

literature laid the foundations for the *Utilitarian Hypothesis*, the *Cognitive Mobilization Hypothesis*, and the *Political Motivation Hypotheses*, incorporating the *Incumbency model*, the *Party Alignment Mode*l, and the *Class Partisanship Model*. Each of these hypotheses are discussed in detail below.

2.1 Utilitarian Hypotheses

Given the original foundation of the European Union as an economic community, it is unsurprising that even today the primary explanations of support for European integration rest on economic issues and concerns. This model was initially formalised by Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel (1998) and proposes that individuals with diverging socio-economic characteristics derive different costs and benefits from EU integration, and hence citizens' support for integration is positively related to their welfare gains emanating from it. Therefore, the *Utilitarian Hypothesis* is largely an economic one, whereby both macro and micro economic factors influence support for integration. The macro explanation is typically carried out at an aggregate cross-country level and finds that support for the EU is primarily motivated by the major three economic factors. High growth, low inflation and low unemployment are attributed to being a positive externality of being a member of the EU and hence influence support for it (see Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996). In addition, such studies also examine the direct economic impact of EU membership by considering the EU-budget ratio, i.e., the percentage return on contributions to the EU budget. This theory suggests that countries with high EU-budget ratios should display greater support for membership as they derive most financial benefit from it. The micro approach, on the other hand, focuses on the individual economic determinants of support for integration. Such micro utilitarian support for European integration can be derived from both objective and subjective factors, whereby one's objective socio-economic characteristics, and subjective perceptions of the economy, may influence support for further integration.

2.1.1 Socio-Economic Determinants

First, individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics may determine whether one will benefit from integration; therefore support for the EU may be

correlated with gender, education and income. Whereby those who posses relatively favourable individual competitiveness characteristics, i.e., high education and high income, tend to display greater levels of support than those with uncompetitive characteristics, such as those with low levels of education and income and the unemployed. According to Gabel (1998), these characteristics influence support for European integration in the following ways: first, labour market liberalisation affects citizens according to their level of human capital, such that those with higher levels of education have a greater ability of apply their skills in a competitive labour market; second, capital liberalisation affects those with higher earnings, as their investment portfolio can be diversified in a more open financial market; and finally, the free movement of goods and labour affects those who reside near borders as they can benefit from more cross-border economic interactions.[2] Another socio-economic factor motivated by the utilitarian hypothesis is occupation; professionals (such as doctors, accountants, lawyers and university professors) who possess highly portable skills are generally more supportive of integration.[3] Among those not active in the labour market, students are typically supportive of the EU, while the retired, unemployed and house persons are generally sceptical about it (Hix, 2004).

2.1.2 Subjective Economic Conditions

In addition to socio-economic characteristics, one of the most consistent explanations of attitudes towards EU membership, is an individual's perception of both their own personal economic well-being and the state of the national economy, i.e., the traditional egotropic and sociotropic measures (see Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Anderson and Reichart, 1996). Positive perceptions of ones' personal economy and the national economy lead to higher support for European integration. Such subjective measures, when employed in individual-level studies, are often used as proxies for objective national economic conditions. However, previous research has shown that subjective perceptions of the economy may not be related to movements in the real economy and that such perceptions are biased by socio-economic

[2] In reality the effects of the Single Market are felt in all areas of the member states, and not just the border regions.

[3] The political economy school would state that these individuals have the power to influence EU policy-makers and politicians and subsequently, these are the individuals who will benefit most from the integrative process. Therefore, rather than supporting the EU for altruistic reasons i.e. greater liberalisation benefits all, they indirectly tailor EU policy to benefit themselves personally.

characteristics and ideological beliefs (see Doyle, 2004 for discussion). Despite this, they are one of the most common and consistently used measures of utilitarian considerations.

On the whole, the Utilitarian Hypothesis has received much attention in the literature. A comprehensive study by Gabel (1998) empirically tests five main European integration theories using Eurobarometer survey data pertaining to the period between 1978 and 1992 and finds that the Utilitarian theory is the most robust explanation for variation in support for European integration.

2.2 Cognitive Mobilisation and Value Hypotheses

Overall, the Utilitarian Hypothesis states that those who believe they will benefit from being a member of the EU will support it. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that the European public know a great deal about the potential and actual benefits of European integration and indeed that they care about them, i.e., that the issue is a salient one. The *Cognitive Mobilisation Hypothesis*, originally developed by Inglehart (1970), in contrast, proposes that individuals with high levels of cognitive mobilisation – i.e., those who possess more information about the economy, are politically aware and engage in political communication – are more likely to favour European integration. This hypothesis is founded on the following assumptions: First, individuals with well developed cognitive skills are better equipped to process abstract information about the EU, and second, as ones level of knowledge about an issue increases, the less threatened one feels by it and subsequently support for the issue increases. Various methods are employed to test the Cognitive Mobilisation Hypothesis. One of the most frequently used measures of cognitive mobilisation is the respondents' self-reported level of knowledge about the EU.[4] According to this theory

[4] It should be noted that such self-reported level of knowledge, firstly, may be an overestimation of actual knowledge and secondly, may be endogenous i.e. respondents who support EU membership may be more likely to invest in acquiring information about the EU. Therefore, in addition to examining the impact of EU knowledge on support for membership, these self-assessment variables are instrumented using questions regarding the respondents languages spoken, visits abroad and history of working abroad, on the assumption that people who speak EU languages and/or have visited/worked in the EU in the past will be in a better position to acquire information. This information is extracted from a series of questions which ask respondents which languages, other than their mother tongue, can they speak; which languages do they think are most useful to know; which/if any countries did they visit in the last two years; and finally, which/if any country, apart from their home country, did they work in during the last two years. However, as these questions were only asked in some earlier CEEB surveys, they could

all information about the European process increases the level of support for integration.

A frequently used measure that captures political awareness is the respondents' level of interest in politics or how frequently they engage in political discussions. These measures capture the respondent's overall level of political sophistication, with high sophistication corresponding to high levels of EU support. However, empirical studies in regards the Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses are inconclusive (see Janssen, 1991; and Gabel, 1998). The inconclusiveness of this hypothesis leads this paper to reformulate the classic Cognitive Mobilisation Hypothesis such that knowledge of the EU may or may not increase support, however it does create more clearly defined attitudes about the EU, and those attitudes may be either positive or negative.

Another hypothesis, proposed by Inglehart (1970), entilited the Values Hypothesis, states that support for EU integration rests on value orientations formed through socialisation during an individual's formative years. Inglehart claims that the EU stands for a more egalitarian society that should be more attractive to individuals possessing post-materialist rather than materialistic values (Gabel, 1998). Individuals who favour non-material values such as self-fulfilment, over material values, such as security, are more likely to support integration. While support for this hypothesis holds for the original member states in the 1960's, evidence is less conclusion for the countries that joined the EU later. In addition, Ehin (2001) argues that such values, which are an outcome of advanced industrialised economies, may not be applicable to the post-communist countries. Alternative measures of values which capture the belief system within post-communist societies have been proposed (see Tverdova and Anderson, 2000; Ehin, 2001). Individuals who support the democratic process and the market economy are more likely to support EU membership than those who favour authoritarian systems and closed economies.

not be included in the overall analysis (as it is a comparative study). Nevertheless, the results of these alternative cognitive mobilisation measures for the CCEB survey are available upon request.

2.3 Political Motivation Hypotheses

In the absence of possessing a large body of knowledge about the EU, citizens may rely on heuristics when forming opinions or making choices. These heuristics or cognitive shortcuts (see Tverdova and Anderson, 2003) in regards EU policy, often come from domestic politics, whereby voters use either the incumbent government or their preferred political party in order to gauge information about the EU process, and subsequently whether to support it or not. Several studies have shown a correlation between partisan alignment, incumbency support and class partisanship (Hug and Sciarini, 2000; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994).

2.3.1 Partisan Alignment

Loyalty to particular political parties, whether in government or not, may influence preferences towards European integration. Previous research (Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien, 1994; Tucker, Pacek and Berlinsky, 2002) has found that respondents' support for EU integration is a function of whether they support "Eurosceptic" or "Pro-EU" parties, also known as "Europhile" parties. This hypothesis states that the European public follow their party line in regards European integration, independent of their personal characteristics which may shape both attitudes towards integration and party choice. The typical measure used to capture this hypothesis is either the respondents' self-reported past voting behaviour, or their stated voting intentions in a hypothetical future election. By following party lines, the voters minimise the amount of information which they need to collect about the EU, therefore it is a relatively costless voting strategy. In addition, some studies (e.g., Midtbo and Hines, 1998) suggest that the causality between party alignment and support for the EU may run in the opposite direction, such that political parties may also be affected by the outcome of EU referenda. However, Pierce, Valen and Listhaug (1983) posit that this is conditional on whether the parties take a clear stance on the issue. Supporters of parties which are indifferent to EU matters are likely to be unaffected by the Party Alignment Hypothesis.

2.3.2 Incumbent Support

Many of the EU-15 models find that support for EU integration, particularly in referenda situations, is a function of support for the incumbent government. Hence, if voters are satisfied with the current national government they are more likely to

support a vote on furthering EU integration (see Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh, 1995; Hug and Sciarini, 2000). According to Ray (2003), the relationship between incumbent support and pro-EU sentiments is a conditional one. The relationship holds in the context of EU referenda, but is either weak or negative when examining support for further integration outside the referendum context or when additional controls are included. The *Incumbency Hypothesis* held in the early stages of the European process, whereby citizens, through a lack of knowledge and interest in European affairs, simply allowed their politicians to pursue further integrative policies. However, the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent referenda during the 1990's saw the first signs of public opposition. Several studies (Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994) have noted that the European public no longer obediently follow the positions of their governments.

2.3.3 Class Partisanship

The *Class Partisanship hypothesis*, which emphasises the importance of class alignment in the formation of attitudes towards integration, has received much attention in the literature. This hypothesis is based on the traditional Left-Right cleavage model, whereby right-wing supporters typically favour EU membership while left-wing supporters oppose it (see Ingelhart, Rabier and Raif, 1991). Traditionally, left-wing parties opposed greater European integration, and right-wing parties favoured, it as it was regarded as a capitalist endeavour. However, there is a lack of consistent evidence to support this hypothesis (Gabel, 2000). In addition, it appears that this traditional ideological hypothesis, no longer holds in the current political environment as such a restrictive dichotomy is now inappropriate. Several studies (Marks, Wilson Ray, 2002; Taggart, 1998) have found that the relationship between the Left/Right position and support for integration is now an inverted U-shaped curve, whereby centrist parties support integration and both extreme left and extreme right parties oppose it. Marks, Hooghe, Edwards and Nelson (2004) introduce an additional dimension to European politics, entitled the "New Politics" or the Gal/Tan dimension, where "Gal" represents the Green/Alternative/Libertarian parties, and "Tan" represents the Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalist parties. Generally, Tan parties oppose EU integration as they see it as threatening the nation state, while Gal parities tend to support it. A correlation is typically found between Left and Gal, and Right and Tan parties in Western Europe, however in Central and Eastern Europe,

the Left-Tan and Right-Gal dimensions are more dominant. Additionally, a study by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) find that Eurosceptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe tend to be on the right of the political spectrum compared to those in Western Europe. Overall, these studies show that the reliance on the traditional Left-Right dimension to explain support for European integration is no longer relevant. These new dimensions, therefore, emphasise the importance of party families for dictating positions on European integration, with social democrats, Christian-democrats, conservatives, liberals and regionalist/ethnic parties having similar EU positions among political parties in both Western and Eastern Europe.

2.3 Cross National Differences in Support

As the EU currently consists of 25 different nation states with distinct historical, cultural and political legacies, there may be importance cross-country differences in determining support for the EU. For example, some countries are traditionally more Eurosceptic than others e.g., Great Britain, Denmark. Hix (2004) identifies three dimensions which may explain both differing cross-country and even intra-country attitudes towards the EU: first, cultural differences, such as weak vs. strong national identities, Catholics vs. Protestant, North vs. South, East vs. West, homogenous vs. multi-ethnic societies; second, economic differences, such as, rich vs. poor, urban vs. rural, industrial vs. agricultural, centre vs. periphery, large vs. small, income inequality; and third, political differences, such as, long vs. short democratic traditions, majoritarian vs. consensual, corporatist vs. pluralist, liberal vs. social welfare states. Other potential explanations for cross-country differences include the time and circumstance of entry into the EU. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) posit that countries entering the EU at different stages have different levels of enthusiasm for integration.

3. Support for European Integration in the New Members

The preceding section discusses the various hypotheses developed to account for support for European integration in the old member states. Parallel to this, there are several studies which have analysed support for EU membership in the candidate

countries, now the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to adopting some of the above hypotheses, many studies have emphasised the importance of post-communist experiences in determining attitudes towards EU membership. The standard utilitarian socio-economic considerations are encompassed into the winners and losers hypothesis, whereby individuals who benefited from the reform process due to their favourable human capital characteristics display much greater support for accession to the EU than those who fared badly during the transition process. In regards the values hypothesis, these studies find that positive attitudes towards democracy and capitalism also increase support for integration in general. Overall, evidence supporting the Utilitarian Model and Political Motivation Hypotheses prevails. In order to gauge the main findings concerning the determinants of support for EU membership in the new members, several of these studies are discussed in detail below.

One of the most comprehensive studies of attitudes towards EU membership is carried out by Tucker, Pacek and Berlinsky (2002) who use the 1996 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer survey to investigate the determinants of support for EU accession within 10 post-communist countries. Overall, they find that those who support the free market and may be characterised as "winners" of the transition process also support EU membership, while those who oppose free market actions and can be considered "losers" of the transition process tend to oppose EU membership. Tucker *et al.*'s approach may appear analogous to the traditional utilitarian hypothesis, however, they deviate from it by stating that support for EU membership is related to how the individuals' economic position has changed during the transition period, rather than how joining the EU will change economic positions in the future. Thus, their explanation of support for EU membership, though utilitarian in nature, is retrospectively rather than prospectively motivated. In addition, they also find that positive attitudes towards the EU in Hungary and Slovakia are related to support for pro-EU political parties. Therefore unlike other studies (Cichowski, 2000), which find that support for the EU is related to party preferences, they find that attitudes towards the EU influence support towards different political parties.

Another study utilising the 1996 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer survey, by Tverdova and Anderson (2000), analyses attitudes towards EU enlargement in six

candidate countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia). They also find evidence in support of the utilitarian model, while the party alignment thesis and attitudes towards the transition process, yield only weak support. Contrary to the classic utilitarian approach, however, individuals possessing higher education do not favour enlargement any more than those with lower levels of education. A similar study by Cichowski (2000), on the other hand, examining support for the EU in five candidate countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) in 1996, finds evidence in support of the political motivation hypothesis, whereby an individual's political partisanship and attitudes towards democracy are the most important determinants of EU support. Unlike previous studies, they find that economic perceptions have little effect on support for EU membership.

While the majority of studies to date have concentrated on analysing the so-called *Visegrad-4* countries[5], Ehin (2001), tests the applicability of three existing theories of public support for EU integration (utilitarian expectations, political values and domestic politics) in the context of the Baltic States. Ehin finds that economic expectations and domestic politics are significant determinants of support. Contrary to previous findings, individual competitiveness does not influence patterns of support for EU integration; while the education and gender hypotheses hold, income and unemployment are not significant determinants of support, suggesting that the classic utilitarian model is not applicable to the Baltic countries. Ehin suggests that such measures of competitiveness may not be appropriate in a post-communist context where there is much social mobility and changing labour market conditions. Ehin finds that the unemployed, i.e., those who are expected to gain through redistribution programs, are in favour of EU enlargement. Therefore this study finds dual support for accession, firstly from those who will benefit from a competitive labour market, and secondly, from those who will benefit from the European welfare state.

In addition to these comparative analyses, several studies focus on individual counties, with Poland receiving the most attention to date. First, Markowski and Tucker (2003) analyse support for EU membership as demonstrated in the 2003 Polish referendum, and in individual-level survey data from Exit Polls from June 2003. They test three

[5] Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

hypotheses - the "winners/losers" model (in which the "winners" of the transition process have a higher probability of supporting EU enlargement than the "losers"); the party alignment hypothesis (which examines the link between previous vote choice in the 2001 parliamentary election and the 2003 referendum); and finally a political motivation hypothesis (which examines the effect of ideological self-placement, evaluation of the incumbent, and interest in politics). Overall, the economic and political hypotheses have a more consistent effect on support for EU membership than demographic factors, with satisfaction with the incumbent government proving the most significant determinant of EU support. Slomczynski and Shabad (2003) also undertake a panel data analysis of attitudes towards EU membership in Poland. They examine both changes in attitudes over time (1995-1999) and the determinants of these changes. They specifically examine the impact of social class, subjective economic well-being, degree of exposure to the West, partisan preferences, attitudes towards socialism and democracy, and cognitive mobilisation (as measured by respondents level of interest in politics), on support for EU membership. It is found that both political orientations and utilitarian calculations play a role in influencing citizens' preferences regarding EU enlargement. In addition, pro-democratic and pro-capitalist values are also predictors of EU support.

Finally, Loveless and Rohrschneider (2004) investigate whether support for EU membership in Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine is related to attitudes towards prior experience with other international organisations. They find that positive attitudes towards NATO[6] are correlated with positive attitudes towards EU membership. They posit that as NATO (a supra-national international organisation) is seen as a positive influence in post-communist countries, then support for NATO should subsequently increase support for the EU (i.e., another international organisation). While they examine overall support for EU integration, they also examine attitudes towards specific outcomes of integration, namely support for foreign investment. They find higher support for EU membership than for foreign investment. Contrary to other studies, they do not find a relationship between economic perceptions and support for the EU (apart from the Ukraine where sociotropic measures are more important then egotropic ones), however the strong effect of the NATO coefficient could be

[6] There are parallels between the determinants of support for the NATO and the EU. Support for NATO has been related to gender, political affiliation, residence, age and education.

dominating any potential economic effects. While they control for several other factors which may influence support for the EU, they do not discuss the potential collinearity between attitudes towards EU membership and attitudes towards NATO, therefore it is possible that the relationship between support for the NATO and support for the EU is collinear rather than causal, with similar determinants driving attitudes towards both international organisations.

Overall, the utilitarian hypotheses and the political motivation hypotheses prevail. As seen above, these studies differ from those carried out on the old member states in that they take account of the specific characteristics of the post-communist context. A direct comparison of the determinants of support for integration in the old and new members is not possible with these studies. In order to develop public opinion research for a EU of 25 member states, it is necessary to align both approaches. Given that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now members of the EU, they should be analysed as part of that Union, by incorporating the specifics of the post-communist experience into the already established hypotheses. This paper, therefore, empirically tests identical hypotheses for both the EU-15 members and the new member states.

4. Hypotheses

The majority of past studies, both in the EU-15 literature and the Central and East Europe literature (with the exception of a notable few) have focused on analysing only one (or two) existing theories without controlling for alternative explanations. By doing so, one cannot perform a true test of the individual hypotheses as there are additional factors which are being omitted and may indeed influence support for integration. For example, as Gabel (1998) notes *"education may be positively related to support for integration because it raises cognitive mobilisation or because it enables citizens to exploit economic opportunities in an integration market. Without controlling for alternative explanations, it is impossible to test accurately competing theoretical claims"* (pg 334). When testing each individual theory it is therefore necessary to include a variety of potentially influential variables.

This study tests the following 7 hypotheses:

H1: Support for the EU rests on utilitarian considerations, whereby individual socio-economic characteristics are the main determinants of support.

H2: Support for the EU rests on utilitarian considerations, whereby positive subjective perceptions of the economy increase EU support.

H3: Support for the EU rests on cognitive mobilisation factors, whereby greater knowledge of the EU increases the respondent's probability of having clearly defined (either positive or negative) opinions of the EU, while respondents with less knowledge are more likely to posses an indeterminate or only moderately positive/negative attitude.

H4: Support for the EU rest on cognitive mobilisation factors, whereby higher levels of political sophistication are related to greater EU support.

H5: Support for the EU follows partisan alignment, such that individuals follow cues from their preferred political parties; hence supporters of Eurosceptic parties display less support for the EU.

H6: Support for the EU mirrors incumbent support, whereby individuals who support the current governing party display greater support for integration.

H7: Support for the EU follows class partisanship, whereby supporters of different political family groups display differing levels of support for the EU.

It should be noted that each hypothesis is first tested individually by including the main variable of interest for each hypothesis and a set of control variables, and finally all seven hypotheses are estimated jointly in a full model. First however, section 5 describes the data used and methodology employed in the empirical analysis.

5. Data and Methodology

5.1 The Survey Data

The empirical analysis is performed using two datasets with a common set of features. The first is the October/November 2003 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) opinion poll, commissioned by the European Commission and carried out by Gallup Europe in all 13 candidate countries (i.e., also including Bulgaria, Romania and

Turkey, in addition to the ten countries which became members in 2004). The CCEB dataset includes the responses of 12,165 individuals and contains extensive information on their socio-economic characteristics, past vote choice, attitudes towards the EU, in addition to their intended vote in the referendum on EU membership. Each CCEB survey contains approximately 1,000 respondents per country, except for Cyprus and Malta with 500 respondents each and Poland and Turkey with 2,000 each. The surveys were carried out by means of face-to-face interviews and are representative at the national level.[7]

The second database is the April/May 2000 Eurobarometer 53 opinion poll, which is also commissioned by the European Commission and is carried out in each of the EU-15 member states (it carries out separate surveys in Northern Ireland and East Germany, hence overall 17 surveys are analysed). This dataset includes responses from 16,978 individuals and contains similar information to the above CCEB surveys. Each EB survey contains approximately 1000 respondents, apart from Northern Ireland and Luxembourg with 300 and 600 respondents respectively. While more recent EB surveys are available, the EB 53 survey, which was carried out in 2000, is the latest survey to include the respondents' choice of political party, hence enabling the testing of the political motivation hypotheses.

5.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable employed in this analysis is dictated by the need to find a comparable question across the two surveys. The dependent variable therefore is based on responses to the following question: *"Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union is (would be) 1) "a good thing", 2) "neither good nor bad", 3) "a bad thing"*.[8] Rather than use questions that address attitudes towards the specific processes of the EU (e.g., monetary union, common foreign policy etc.), this measure captures respondents' overall attitudes towards the EU. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the dependent variables across both surveys. It shows that support for the European Union is highest in Romania, followed by Ireland,

[7] Between one and two CCEB surveys were carried out per year since the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey was inaugurated in 2000 but the primary data of these surveys so far have not been released publicly.

[8] For both the dependent and independent variables, the "don't know" responses were dropped from the analysis.

Luxembourg and Bulgaria, while support is lowest in Great Britain, Sweden and Austria. Overall, there is no clear divide between the attitudes of the new and old members, while those countries that have yet to join the Union display the greatest support for it (see Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2004 for a similar observation based on a different CCEB survey). As the dependent variable is categorical, multinomial logit models are estimated for both the EB and CCEB surveys.

5.3 Independent Variables

Three sets of independent variables are included in the analysis in order to test each of the above hypotheses. First, in order to test the *Utilitarian Hypotheses* both objective and subjective factors must be considered. To account for the objective determinants, a set of standard socio-economic variables are included: gender, martial status, age, age squared, household size, education, economic status and income (see Appendix A for exact description). According to the Utilitarian Hypothesis individuals with diverging socio-economic characteristics derive different costs and benefits from EU integration. Previous studies (e.g., Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998) have found that those with greater levels of education, higher incomes and white-collar professional occupations tend to display greater support for European integration than those with lower skills, income and education. In regards gender, previous studies (e.g., Nelsen and Guth, 2000) have found a modest gender gap, whereby women are less supportive of the EU than men.[9] Following Inglehart's (1970) assertions, age is generally found to be negatively related to support for further integration, as younger age groups are likely to possess post-materialist values, which are more supportive of integration.

In order to control for the subjective determinants of the Utilitarian Hypothesis, measures of economic perceptions are also included. Similarly to Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002), and Doyle (2004) both the retrospective and prospective economic

[9] Possible explanations for the gender divide include the Cultural model, whereby women are guided by different values; the Ideological model, which states women pursue different ideological goals; the Perceived Interest model, which states that labour market integration differs for men and women; the National Tradition model, which posits that attitudes towards regional and global integration are determined by national traditions; and finally, the political economy explanation, which states that winners have different attitudes than losers, and as women are more likely to have lower education they feel more trapped by integration.

perception questions are combined to create an overall measure of the individual's economic well-being. The retrospective measure asks respondents' whether their personal economic situation improved, stayed the same or got worse in the last five years, while the prospective measures asks whether they expect their personal economic situation to improve, stay the same or get worse in the next five years (for exact wording see Appendix A). These questions were asked in both the EB and CCEB surveys. These measures are combined, rather than including them independently, due to the high correlation between the two (r=0.40 in EB and r=0.43 in CCEB) and additionally (following the intuition of Tucker *et al.* 2002) the combined measure portrays the strongest "economic winners", i.e., those whose personal situation has already improved and is expected to get better, and the strongest "economic losers", i.e., those whose situation has worsened and is likely to deteriorate further. The variable is then rescaled along a 0-1 continuum.

Second, in order to test the *Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses*, two measures which gauge the respondents' awareness of European integration are included. The first measure of cognitive mobilisation determines how much the European public know about the EU, and is captured by responses to the following question *"How much do you feel you know about the EU, its policies, its institutions?"* Answers are coded on a scale of 1= *"know nothing at all"* to 10= *"know a great deal"*. Overall, the majority of respondents declare that they do not have much knowledge of the European Union with only 1.1% (in EB) and 1.39% (in CCEB) of all respondents declaring they know a great deal. Indeed, the distribution of knowledge appears to be consistent across the EU-15 members and the new members, with 72% in both surveys declaring they do not know a lot about the EU (ranges 1-5), suggesting that being a member of the EU does not automatically increase one's knowledge of it. The second measure of cognitive mobilisation gauges the respondent's level of political sophistication through the following question *"When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters, frequently, occasionally or never?*[10] Only 12.4% of the EU-15 members declare that they frequently discuss politics, while 30% never discuss it, with the majority only discussing it occasionally (57%). In the new members, on

[10] The wording of this question changes slightly in the CCEB survey, in that it asked how often the respondent discusses political matters with friends, partners, relatives, fellow workers and other people. For consistency sake we only use responses to the question about friends. In addition, this category has the least number of non-responses/don't knows.

the other hand, the majority of respondents state they never discuss politics (48.6%), while 34% discuss it occasionally and 17% discuss it frequently.

Finally, the third set of independent variables correspond to the three Political Motivation Hypotheses; the *Partisan Alignment Hypothesis*, the *Incumbency Hypothesis* and the *Party Family Hypothesis*. The formulation of the variables used to test these hypotheses is centred on the following question: *"If a general election were held tomorrow, which political party would you vote for?"* Both the EB 53 and CCEB 2003.4 surveys ask this particular question (unfortunately it is not a standard feature in the EB Trend surveys). Therefore using this question, three additional variables were created.

First, in order to determine whether respondents follows cues from their preferred political party, each party in the EB 53 survey is coded as a Eurosceptic or Pro-EU party using the Marks/Steenbergen Experts Party Database. This expert database codes all major parties in the EU-15 member states according to their ideology, party family, orientation towards the EU, etc. In regards support for the EU, the variable is ordered on a scale of 1-7, whereby a party is coded 1 if it strongly opposes the EU and 7 if it strongly supports the EU. Using this dataset, almost all parties mentioned in the EB survey were classified accordingly. However, as the Party Alignment variable in the CCEB survey it is a dummy variable whereby 0 represents a pro-EU party and 1 is a Eurosceptic party, in order to make the two measures comparable, the scaled variable in the EB survey is transformed into a dummy variable matching the one in the CCEB survey, whereby 1-3 is coded 1 and 4-7 coded 0. Parties which were not included in the Marks/Steenbergen database, but were mentioned in the EB survey, were dropped from the analysis, therefore in total 48 parties were coded.[11] In addition, only parties which received more than 50 votes were included in the analysis. Overall 79.47% of respondents declared they would vote for Pro-EU parties (see Table 2).

[11] As Luxembourg, Northern Ireland and East Germany, are not included in the Marks/Steenbergen dataset, the Political Motication hypotheses cannot be estimated for these countries.

Unfortunately, no comparable dataset is available for the political parties in Central and Eastern Europe.[12] However, by using several different sources (mainly Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) who classify all the main parties in 10 Central and East European countries into hard Eurosceptics and soft Eurosceptics) a similar analysis is carried out. The Central and East European parties are coded 0 if they are regarded as Pro-EU parties and 1 if they are perceived as Eurosceptic parties. While this method deviates from that used for the EB surveys, no alternatives exist until the Central and Eastern Europe Expert datasets are released. Table 3 shows that only 18.47% of respondents in CCEB state that they support a Eurosceptic party.

The Marks/Steenbergen dataset is also used to classify each party in the EB survey into one of seven political family groups: Socialists, Conservatives, Liberal, Religious, Radical Right, Radical Left and Others. Table 4 shows that the majority of respondents state that they would vote for Socialist (35.3%), Conservatives (19.06%) or Liberals (15.17%). In order to classify the parties in CCEB survey into party families, Armingeon and Careja (2004)'s "Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2004", is used to categorise the parties into the same family groups as above. As seen in Table 5, the majority of respondent's state they would vote for Liberals (28.82%), Socialists (20.34%), while contrary to their EU counterparts, only 9.18% state they will vote for Conservatives. Overall, this suggests that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe favour Liberal parties, perhaps reflecting their recent experiences with the economic reform programs, while the old EU members tend to favour Socialist parties. However, it should be noted that over 30% of the Central and East European parties could not be classified as belonging to any particular party family, while only 9% of parties in the EU-15 are unclassified. This reflects the fragility of the party system in the new members.

Finally, in order to test the *Incumbency Hypothesis* a dummy variable is created to capture whether the respondent supports the incumbent government in both surveys. This variable is coded 0 if the party favoured by the respondent is either in opposition or holds less than the majority of seats in the government, and 1 if the respondent favours the party which holds the majority of seats in government. As seen in Table 6

[12] Two separate expert datasets, one by Rohrschneider and Whitefield, another by Marks, Hooghe, Edwards and Nelson, are currently being compiled but are not yet publicly available.

the majority of respondents in both EB and CEEB do not support the incumbent government, with 78.77% of respondents stating support for non-incumbent parties in EB and 66.41% in CCEB. In addition, country dummies are also included in every model to control for cross-country differences.

6. Determinants of Support in the EU-15 and CEEC-13[13]

Tables 9 to 12 presents the results of the Multinomial Logit models of support for the EU in both the EU-15 member states (see EB results) and the 13 new (and potential) members (see CCEB results). The MNL method requires that one of the choices be designated as the base category, therefore to make the interpretation of the coefficient estimates straightforward *"EU is a Bad thing"* is designated as the base category. Tables 9 and 10 present the coefficient estimates for the probability of choosing *"EU is a Good thing"* compared to choosing *"EU is a Bad thing"*, while Tables 11 and 12 presents the coefficient estimates for the probability of choosing *"EU is neither a Good or Bad thing"* compared to choosing *"EU is a Bad thing"*. Eight models are estimated for each of the EB and CCEB surveys – H1 and H2 represent the Utilitarian Hypotheses; H3 and H4 represent the Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses; and H5, H6 and H7 correspond to the Political Motivation Hypotheses. Each of the hypotheses are first tested independently due to possible collinearity (Tables 7 and 8 report the spearman rank correlations of these independent variables), including the variable of interest and a set of control variables, while the final model, H8, incorporates all the individual hypotheses. Overall, the results are quite stable across both surveys, with the determinants of support for integration in the EB and CCEB countries only deviating in regards some of the socio-economic characteristics, while remaining consistent for the main hypotheses of interest.

Utilitarian Hypotheses

H1 in both Table 9 (EB) and 10 (CCEB) analyses the effect of standard socio-economic characteristics on support for the EU. Table 9 first shows that females in the EU-15 are less likely to believe the EU is a good thing compared to men. This effect is significant across all eight models and replicates previous research which suggest

[13] Note, also including Malta and Cyprus.

females are less supportive of integration than men as their placement in the labour market is often such that they are less occupationally mobile than men. However, this effect does not hold for women in Central and Eastern Europe, where the female coefficient, while having a negative impact on support for the EU, is not statistically significant. This suggests the position of women in Western and Eastern Europe may differ. Tables 11 and 12, analysing the effect of socio-economic characteristics on being indifferent towards the EU (i.e., determinants of stating the EU is neither a good or bad thing, compared to stating it is a bad thing) show that females are more likely to believe the EU is neither a good or bad thing rather than believing it is a bad thing. This is consistent in both EB and CCEB, suggesting that, overall, women are more indifference towards the EU rather than viewing it negatively.

Age also has a negative and significant impact across all eight models in the EB survey (Table 9), while also having a negative, albeit weaker, effect in the CCEB survey (Table 10), suggesting that older respondents are less likely to believe the EU is a good thing. The effect however is U-shaped, and support for integration starts rising again when the respondent reaches approximately 56 years of age in the EU-15 members.[14] For the new member states, the impact of age only holds in three of the models, suggesting a less robust relationship; however again, the impact for age is U-shaped with support increasing when respondents reach 64 years of age. In addition, Table 11 also shows that age is negatively related to indifference towards the EU, suggesting the older respondents in the EU-15 countries have a higher probability to stating the EU is a bad thing. This effect is not replicated in CCEB, where the age coefficient has little impact on indifference towards the EU.

Next, household size also has a negative impact on both support and indifference towards the EU in EB (see Tables 9 and 11), while it has only a weak negative impact in some of the models in CCEB survey. This suggests that larger households are less supportive of integration than smaller households. Education has a positive and significant impact across all 8 models for both EB and CCEB surveys. This suggests that those respondents who have a university education or are currently a student have a greater probability of believing the EU is a good thing. Education, however, as seen

[14] Calculated by finding the max/min of the quadratic function.

in Tables 11 and 12, has no impact on indifference towards the EU. Again this finding replicates previous research suggesting that higher education increases support for European integration as individuals with greater skills benefit from more closely integrated labour markets. Also, higher education may, indirectly, increase one's level of cognitive mobilisation, whereby it enables individuals to understand the complex working of the integration process.

Tables 9 and 10 also demonstrate that white-collar professionals have a higher probability of stating the EU is a good thing, again confirming previous work, which finds that professionals, who possess highly mobile skills, are the main recipients of the benefits derived from membership in the EU. Surprisingly, Table 9 shows that house people within the EU-15 members are also supportive of the EU, however this effect does not hold in CCEB countries. Being self-employed, unemployed, retired or a farmer/fisherman has no impact on support for integration in either the EB or CCEB surveys. Of all the occupational status variables, only the farmer/fisherman category has an negative impact on stating the EU is" neither a good or bad thing", suggesting that this group are quite opposed to the EU, again confirming previous work which shows that farmers in both the EU-15 members and the new members are less supportive of the EU. Finally, income has a positive and significant effect on support for the EU in both surveys (Tables 9 and 10), suggesting that higher incomes are associated with greater support for integration, possibly due to the opportunities to be gained through capital market liberalisation. Income also has positive and significant impact on indifference towards the EU (Table 11), in the EB survey.

Several of the country dummies are also significant, suggesting that there are important country level factors that influence support for integration. Among the EU-15 countries (Table 9), the most supportive countries are Belgium (the base category), Ireland and Portugal, while the most Eurosceptic nations are Denmark, Germany, France, Northern Ireland, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden and Austria. In addition, Table 11 shows that the latter countries are also likely to favour opposition rather than indifference towards the EU. Among the CCEB countries (Table 12), the most enthusiastic countries are Bulgaria (the base) and Romania, while all the other countries are relatively less supportive of the EU.

Overall, these results imply that, in terms of socio-economic characteristics, the most pro-European individuals in the old members are Belgian, Irish, Portuguese males who are white-collar professions, highly educated and high-income earners. Among the new and future members, the greatest supporters of integration are also the highly educated, high-earning professionals, however they are not necessarily men, perhaps reflecting the high labour-force participation of women inherited from the communist era.

These results provide evidence in favour of Gabel's original Utilitarian Hypothesis, which focuses on the objective determinants of EU support. H2 then tests the second Utilitarian Hypothesis - the impact of subjective economic perceptions on support for integration. Again Tables 9 and 10 show that support for the EU is positively and significantly related to ones' assessment of their personal economy, i.e., the strongest "economic winners" (those whose personal situation has already improved and is expected to get better) are more supportive of integration than the strongest "economic losers" (those who feel their economic situation has already worsened and is likely to continue deteriorating). The effect also holds in the final model, which combines each of the individual hypotheses. "Economic Winner" also has a positive and significant impact on indifference towards the EU in both EB (Table 11) and CCEB (Table 12), indicating that respondents who have a positive perception of their economic situation are more likely to believe the EU is a good thing or remain indifferent to it rather than oppose it. Overall, the results reveal strong support for the Utilitarian Hypotheses.

Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses

H3 and H4 test the Cognitive Mobilisation hypotheses. The results of H3 in both EB (Table 9) and CCEB (Table 10) surveys demonstrate that greater knowledge about the EU and its policies is related to higher support for integration. This provides evidence in favour of the Cognitive Mobilisation Hypothesis that posits the more knowledge one possesses about an issue, the less threatened they feel by it and subsequently the more likely they will support it. These effects also hold in the full model. Also, greater knowledge of the EU is negatively related to indifference towards it (EB Table 11), suggesting that respondents who state they know very little about the EU are less likely to hold strong opinions about it. However, this effect does not hold in the CCEB survey (Table 12) or in the full models shown in the final columns.

H4 includes a "Discuss Politics" measure that captures the respondents' level of political sophistication. It shows that respondents who state they discuss political matters occasionally (as compared to never - the base category) show higher support for the EU. While the result in consistent in both EB and CCEB surveys, it is only significant at the 5% level and there is no statistical significant relationship between those who discuss politics frequently and support the EU. As seen in Tables 11 and 12 there is a stronger relationship between indifference towards the EU and discussing politics. In the EB survey, respondents who discuss politics either occasionally or frequently are less likely to state indifference compared to opposition towards the EU, and similarly, in the CCEB surveys, those who discuss politics frequently are also less likely to state indifference towards the EU.

These results provide evidence in favour of the new cognitive mobilisation hypothesis that states both discussing political matters and possessing more information about the EU leads to a crystallisation of attitudes concerning the EU, and that these attitudes may be either positive or negative. Hence, those who display low levels of political sophistication or knowledge about European affairs are likely to be indifferent to the EU. Overall, the EU knowledge variable is a more consistent measure of cognitive mobilisation than political sophistication. As the correlation between EU Knowledge and Discuss Politics is 0.38 for the EU-15 and 0.29 for the CCEB countries (see Tables 7 and 8), only the EU knowledge variable is included in the full model to avoid possible multicollinearity. While EU knowledge remains significant in regards the favourable attitudes towards the EU (Tables 9 and 10), it has no effect on indifference towards the EU (Tables 11 and 12).

Political Motivation Hypotheses

H5, H6 and H7 present the results of the three Political Motivation Hypotheses. H5 tests the Partisan Alignment Hypothesis in both EB and CCEB surveys. The variable is dichotomous whereby 1 corresponds to a Eurosceptic party. Firstly, Table 9 shows that respondents in EU-15 who support Eurosceptic parties are less likely to support the EU than those who favour Pro-EU parties. In addition, this effect remains in the final model, thus suggesting that respondents follow cues from their preferred political parties. This result is analogous among the CCEB countries, whereby respondents

who support Eurosceptic parties also have a higher probability of not supporting the EU. Again this finding remains robust in the final model. Tables 11 and 12 also show that respondents who support Eurosceptic parties have a greater probability of stating opposition rather than indifference towards the EU. These results parallel the findings of Markowski and Tucker (2003) who also find that those who voted for Pro-EU parties in the preceding election were more likely to vote in favour of EU enlargement, while right-wing voters were more likely to oppose membership than left-wing voters.

Next, H6 provides a test for the Incumbent Support Hypothesis. Again the results are parallel for both the West and East European countries, whereby respondents who vote for the current incumbent party have a higher probability of supporting the EU than those who vote for the opposition. This incumbency effect drops out of the final model in both EB and CCEB. While support for the incumbent also increases the probability of being indifferent rather than opposing the EU in the EU-15 countries, it has no impact in the CCEB countries. Finally, H7 tests the new Class Partisanship Hypothesis that examines the effect of political party families, rather than the traditional Left-Right class distinction, on support for the EU. The base category for both surveys is Socialist parties. These are mainly Social-Democratic parties, which are positioned centre-left on the traditional ideological scale. Table 9 shows that in the EB survey, respondents who declared they would vote for either a Radical Left, Radical Right, or Liberal party are less supportive of the EU than Social Democratic followers. In Table 10, on the other hand, supporters of Conservative, Liberal or Religious parties are more supportive of the EU than Social Democrats, in the new and potential members. While similar to the EB survey, supporters of Radical Left parties are also Eurosceptics. In addition, supporters of all party families, with the exception of the Social Democrats, are less likely to be indifferent towards the EU than oppose it in the EB survey. Conservative voters in the CCEB survey are more likely to be indifferent rather than opposed to the EU, while Radical Left voters have a higher probability of opposition than indifference.

Overall, the final column[15] in Table 9 demonstrates that support for the EU, among the EU-15 members, is influenced by political party alignment, knowledge of the EU, subjective measures of economic performance, age, education, occupational status and income. Among the Central and East European countries, Table 10 shows that class partisanship, political party alignment, knowledge of the EU, subjective measures of economic performance and education are the main determinants of support for the EU. Therefore, apart from the socio-economic characteristics, the determinants of support for the EU are similar in both the old and new member states. In regards attitudes of indifference towards the EU, Tables 11 and 12 show that indifference is mainly motivated by political party alignment and subjective measures of economic performance for both the EU-15 states and the new and potential members. The substantive impact of these variables is echoed in Appendix B which displays the marginal effects for both the EB and CCEB results. As seen in Tables B.1 and B.2, after the country dummies, the subjective economic winner variable and party alignment measure have the largest impact on support for the EU, overriding any of the socio-economic factors.

7. Determinants of Support in the EU-28

The above results show that the main hypotheses concerning support for the EU are identical in both the EU-15 members and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This section therefore pools both the Eurobarometer and the Candidate Country Eurobarometer surveys, in order to test the seven main hypotheses across all 28 European countries. The pooled dataset includes 28,243 observations representing 28 different countries. All the variables, including the dependent variable, remain the same[16], however a dummy variable is included to account for the two different surveys. In order to test which hypothesis holds across all European countries, a MNL model is estimated and is reported in Tables 13 (representing the determinants of choosing *"EU is a Good Thing"* compared to "*EU is a Bad Thing"*) and 5.14

[15] In order to test for the presence of multicollinearity due to the inclusion of all the explanatory variables in the full model, each of the full models are first estimated using the standard OLS procedure, and then the variance inflation factors were calculated. As all the variables (apart from age and age squared) have a VIF value less than 20 this suggests that multicollinearity among the main hypotheses of interest is not a problem.

[16] The income deciles used in CCEB are transformed into income quartiles to match those in EB.

(representing the determinants of choosing *"EU is neither a Good or Bad thing"* over *"EU is a Bad Thing"*). Again, each column tests each of the seven hypotheses, while the final column represents the full model including all variables. As expected, the results do not differ overtly from the individual survey results.

7.1 Results of MNL Determinants of Support in EU-28

As seen in Table 13, females, older respondents and large households show less support for the EU than the highly educated, students, self-employed, white-collar professionals, house persons and those with higher incomes. The effect of these variables is consistent across all 7 models. In the full model, however, only the effect of education, white-collar occupation and income remains. Table 14 shows that the socio-economic variables have a much more modest impact on the determinants of stating indifference about the EU rather than opposing it. For example, only females and farmers has a consistent impact, whereby females have a greater probability of stating indifference rather than opposition, while farmers show opposition rather than indifference towards the EU. H2 in both Table 13 and 14 measures the second Utilitarian Hypothesis - the effect of subjective economic perceptions on support for the EU - both tables show that respondents who are optimistic about their economic situation have a greater probability of stating the EU is either a good thing, or neither a good or bad thing, compared to stating it is a bad thing, hence positive economic perceptions increase support for the EU. This effect is also consistent in the full model.

H3 and H4 report the Cognitive Mobilisation determinants of support. First, Table 13 shows that respondents who possess greater knowledge of the EU are more likely to support it. This effect remains constant in the full model. In regards indifference towards the EU, however, the effect of knowledge is only significant at the 10% level in Table 14 and drops out in the full model. Next, H4 reports the political sophistication hypothesis - Table 13 shows that respondents who discuss politics occasionally are more likely to support the EU, while surprisingly, discussing politics alot has no effect on support. As seen in the individual survey analysis, the correlation coefficient between discussing politics and knowledge about the EU is r=0.33. Hence, given the consistent effect of the EU knowledge measure, this variable is only

included in the final model, as it seems a more reliable measure of cognitive mobilisation than the political sophistication variable. Table 14 shows that those who discuss politics either occasionally or alot, are less likely to be indifferent about the EU. Overall, these results again suggest that greater knowledge of the EU is related to higher levels of support for European integration.

H5, H6 and H7 report the Political Motivation Hypotheses. First, H5 in both Table 13 and 14 demonstrate that support for Eurosceptic parties decreases support for the EU. This provides evidence in favour of the Partisan Alignment hypothesis, whereby respondents are influenced by the policy positions of their favoured political party. Again this results holds also in the full model. H6 tests the Incumbency Hypothesis and finds that support for the incumbent government also increases support for the EU, suggesting that assessments of the EU are often assessment of national, rather than European, political concerns. Next, H7 tests the impact of support for various political family groups on support for the EU. Both 13 and 14 show that supporters of conservative, liberal, religious and socialist parries are more likely to either support or be indifferent to the EU, compared to supporters of radical right-wing parties. Table 13 shows that as before, supporters of radical left parties are less likely to support the EU, than oppose it. The impact of the party family groups, however, mainly drops out in the full model, where only the positive impact of the Conservative supporters remains.

Finally, there are also notable cross-country difference in support for European integration. The base category is Belgium, which is often perceived as a Pro-EU nation. Therefore, Table 13 shows that Denmark, East and West Germany, France, Northern Ireland, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia have a lower probability of supporting the EU, while, Ireland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are more likely to support the EU relative to Belgium.

Overall, support for European integration, as seen in the full model, is a combination of several established hypotheses, with the Party Alignment hypothesis and the subjective Utilitarian hypothesis proving the most significant determinants of support, with the Incumbency hypothesis and Cognitive Mobilisation hypotheses also proving

significant. Among the socio-economic factors, education and white collar professionals, and to some extent, gender and income, are also important determinants of support for the EU. Finally, the substantive impact of these results are mirrored in Appendix B, where Table B.3 presents the marginal effects for the EU-28 model. Again, the subjective Utilitarian hypothesis and the Party Alignment hypothesis have the largest impact on support for the EU.

It is necessary to carry out both the Hausman and Small-Hsiao test in order to test whether the IIA assumption holds in the MNL models. The results of both tests for each of the full MNL models are reported in Appendix C. Neither the Hausman test nor the Small-Hsiao test in the EB, CCEB or EU-28 models reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds.

8. Discussion

According to Hix (2004) the most pro-European individual is *"an Irish, Italian or Benelux male, who is a professional or company director, younger than 55, highly educated, a practising Catholic, and a member of the political or cultural elite"*. The findings in this study mirror those of Hix, except the list of the most enthusiastic Europeans should include also the Bulgarians and Romanians whose countries have yet to join the Union, while among the actual EU members, the Portuguese, Slovaks and the Hungarians have taken over the role of Euro-enthusiasts. On May 1st 2004 the European landscape experienced a dramatic transformation as the EU expanded to incorporate 10 new members, to create a Union of 25 countries. Despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm demonstrated at the EU referenda that took place throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 2003 (see Doyle and Fidrmuc, 2004), all the referenda were passed and eight post-communist and two Mediterranean countries are now full members of the European Union. With this, the size of the European public has substantially increased and therefore so too has the importance of European public opinion.

This study attempts to extend the EU public opinion literature to include the new members of Central and Eastern Europe, in order to test whether the archetypical EU

supporter still remains in the new enlarged Union. This paper has dual functions. First it is a comparative investigation into the determinants of support for European integration in both the "old" EU-15 members and the "new" and future EU member states. While separate literatures have evolved in regards both regions, no comparative study, thus far, has been performed. Second, this study also provides a comprehensive and rigorous test of all the main hypotheses concerning the determinants of support for the European Union. In testing seven established hypotheses, while controlling for the individual socio-economic factors, this study allows a true test of all the major hypotheses in the field. Overall, the results suggest that while the determinants of support for European integration are very similar in both the old and new members, there is no clear-cut "winner" in regards the theories of support for European integration, with several hypotheses proving consistent across each model.

The most consistent hypothesis is the Utilitarian approach. In regards socio-economic characteristics, this study confirms Gabel's original findings, such that individuals who possess higher education and higher earnings tend to support integration due to the gains to be realised through labour market and capital market liberalisation. In addition, white-collar professionals consistently show greater support for the EU compared to other occupations. Age and Gender have a less consistent effect on attitudes towards the EU. In general, older respondents and females are more likely to feel indifference towards the EU, rather than being enthusiastic or in opposition to it. The subjective utilitarian hypothesis proves to be another stable determinant of support, whereby individuals who are optimistic about their past and future economic well-being display greater levels of support for the EU than individuals whose economic circumstances are bleak. Overall, the importance of these objective and subjective economic factors evoke a clear picture of the classic EU-enthusiast - they are typically well-educated, high earning professional males who are in economically strong positions. Such consistent evidence in favour of the Utilitarian hypotheses suggest that support for the European Union is therefore founded on expectations of welfare gains rather than more "affective" concerns or abstract concepts regarding ideological or non-material attachment to the idea of a European state.

Contrary to recent studies that find that the Cognitive Mobilisation Hypothesis does not hold in the European context, this analysis finds that individuals with higher levels

of cognitive mobilisation are generally more supportive of European integration than those with low cognitive levels. Overall, individuals who have acquired knowledge of the EU generally display greater support, than those whose EU knowledge is limited. Those who do not possess much knowledge about the EU are also likely to display more indeterminant attitudes towards it. The low correlation between education levels and knowledge of the EU (r=0.26), suggest that this result is not driven by collinearity, but by true cognitive mobilisation factors, which state that greater knowledge about an issue subsequently reduces feelings of alienation towards it and thus increases approval for it. Given that both surveys suggest a large majority of the public possess very little knowledge of the EU, increasing the publics' awareness of European issues may help create a European mentality and consequently increase support for it. Evidence in favour of the second Cognitive Mobilisation Hypothesis however is weak, whereby political sophistication does not have a consistent impact on support for integration. In general, the political sophistication literature posits that individuals who regularly engage in political discourse tend to support new social trends; hence the present wave of globalisation, and further European integration, are endorsed by members of the political and cultural elite. However, this study shows that engaging in political discussions does not directly increase support for further integration. The cognitive mobilisation hypotheses enhance the findings of a utilitarian Europe, whereby those who know alot about the EU, are aware of the benefits and opportunities to be realised in an integrated Europe and therefore display greater support.

Utilitarian considerations are not limited to the economic sphere. Indeed, given the significant costs involved, in terms of time and motivation, when gathering information about the EU, one can also derive significant benefits by using short-cuts or heuristics when forming opinions about European issues. Therefore, when gathering information about the EU, individuals often rely on information from the domestic political sphere. Moreover, the Political Motivation Hypotheses claim that the determinants of support for the EU rests on the EU policy stance of the incumbent government, the individuals' preferred political party, and the individual preferred political family. In regards the three Political Motivation Hypotheses, evidence is most favourable to the Partisan Alignment hypothesis, whereby supporters of Eurosceptic parties show less support for the EU, while supporters of Pro-EU parties

regularly display greater support for further European integration. Hence, it appears that the European public, given the general lack of knowledge concerning European issues, follow cues from their political parties when forming attitudes about the EU. This confounds the present consensus that believes that the European public have become more inquiring and critical of European affairs. While this view is somewhat substantiated given the lack of evidence in support of the Incumbency Support Hypothesis, whereby the public are no longer following the governing party's position, overall it shows that Europeans are still relying on domestic issues to dictate their EU stance.

One of the most important outcomes of this study is that old and new Europeans are remarkably similar to each other. Despite different cultural, social and religious traditions and the legacy of decades spent under communist regimes, the same factors affect the formation of opinions and attitudes on European integration in both sets of countries. As such this finding mirrors two alternative studies that find the attitudes of individuals who once lived under very different regimes tend to converge over time. Anderson and O'Connor (2000) find that attitudinal differences between East and West Germans are very low despite years of separation. While Nannestad, Paldam and Rosholm (2003) find very little difference in the attitudes of native Israelis and immigrant Soviet Jews. In addition, Fidrmuc and Doyle (2004) demonstrates the political assimilation of migrants from former communist countries into various different political and economic systems.

The findings in this study are therefore important as they signify that the enlarged European Union will be more cohesive and less fragmented and prone to disagreement than one might have thought prior to the latest enlargement. These results also suggest that one should not see future enlargements as a threat to the European integration process – indeed, nationals of the countries currently left out of the EU are among the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration.

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Tables

Table 1 Dependent Variable: Support for the EU (arranged in descending order)

Countries	EU GOOD	Neither GOOD nor BAD	EU BAD
Romania	86.97	10.56	2.46
Ireland	81.62	12.5	5.88
Luxembourg	78.37	14.88	6.75
Bulgaria	78.17	18.64	3.19
Netherlands	76.75	16.79	6.46
Spain	71.28	22.29	6.43
Turkey	70.4	17.68	11.92
Portugal	70.0	24.78	5.22
Greece	66.56	25.74	7.7
Belgium	65.41	23.89	10.7
Malta	64.56	19.83	15.61
Hungary	63.94	25.94	10.12
Italy	62.94	27.05	10.01
Lithuania	62.85	28.02	9.13
Cyprus	61.18	27.43	11.39
Slovakia	59.31	32.5	8.2
Poland	56.36	29.74	13.9
Denmark	54.88	20.33	24.79
Slovenia	52.5	40.31	7.19
France	52.36	32.88	14.76
Czech Republic	51.38	34.29	14.33
Latvia	49.79	32.98	17.23
Northern Ireland	49.16	38.24	12.61
West Germany	48.95	33.96	17.09
Estonia	43.94	39.09	16.97
Finland	42.21	35.81	21.98
East Germany	38.57	46.9	14.53
Austria	36.43	35.78	27.79
Sweden	35.88	26.58	37.54
Great Britain	32.77	37.62	29.61

Source: Eurobarometer 53 (April/May 2000) and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4 (Oct/Nov 2004).

Note: The table reports answers to the question: "Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union is/would be 1. A Good thing, 2. Neither Good nor Bad, 3.A Bad thing.

Table 2 Political Parties EU Position in EB 53

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Opposed	Opposed	Somewhat Opposed	Neutral	Somewhat in Favour	In Favour	Strongly in Favour
3.81%	8.0%	2.69%	6.05%	22.77%	44.79%	11.91%

Source: EB 53 Survey and Marks/Steenbergen Dataset (1999).

Table 3 Political Parties EU Position in CCEB 2003.4

Pro-EU Parties %	Eurosceptic Parties %
81.53	18.47

Source: CCEB 2003.4 Survey and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004).

Table 4 Political Families in EB 53

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Socialist	Conservative	Liberal	Religious	Radical Right	Radical Left	Other
35.3%	19.06%	15.17%	10.5%	4.79%	6.17%	9.0%

Source: EB 53 Survey and Marks/Steenbergen Dataset (1999).

Table 5 Political Families in CCEB 2003.4

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Socialist	Conservative	Liberal	Religious	Radical Right	Communist	Other
20.34%	9.18%	28.82%	2.95%	2.14%	4.13%	32.44%

Source: CCEB 2003.4 Survey and Armingeon and Careja (2004).

Table 6 Incumbent Party Support

	Non Incumbent %	Incumbent %
EB 53	78.77	21.23
CCEB 2003.4	66.41	33.59

Source: EB 53 and CEEB 2003.4 Surveys and www.electionworld.org.

Table 7 Spearman Rank Correlations of Independent Variables in EB 53

	Economic Winner	Knowledge of EU	Discuss Politics	Party EU Stance	Incumbent Support
Knowledge of EU	0.0516 (0.000)	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics	0.010 (0.220)	0.379 (0.000)	~	~	~
Party EU Stance	-0.046 (0.000)	0.033 (0.000)	0.003 (0.788)	~	~
Incumbency Support	0.009 (0.266)	-0.001 (0.891)	0.012 (0.133)	0.111 (0.000)	~
Political Party Family	0.027 (0.012)	-0.040 (0.000)	-0.016 (0.131)	-0.072 (0.000)	0.038 (0.000)

Note: Significance levels in parenthesis.

Table 8 Spearman Rank Correlations of Independent Variables in CCEB 2003.4

	Economic Winner	Knowledge of EU	Discuss Politics	Party EU Stance	Incumbent Support
Knowledge of EU	0.208 (0.000)	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics	0.033 (0.000)	0.294 (0.000)	~	~	~
Party EU Stance	-0.133 (0.000)	-0.112 (0.000)	-0.018 (0.142)	~	~
Incumbency Support	0.077 (0.000)	-0.006 (0.606)	-0.035 (0.004)	0.130 (0.000)	~
Political Party Family	-0.009 (0.474)	0.009 (0.442)	-0.010 (0.404)	-0.152 (0.000)	-0.226 (0.000)

Note: Significance levels in parenthesis.

Table 9 EB 53 MNL Determinants of stating the EU is GOOD THING

Base: EU Bad	Utilitarian Hypotheses				Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses				Political Motivation Hypotheses						Full Model	
	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7			
Party: Conservative	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.165	(0.127)	-0.073	(0.152)
Party: Liberal	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.314**	(0.127)	-0.421**	(0.162)
Party: Religious	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.221	(0.146)	-0.221	(0.162)
Party: Radical Right	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-1.615***	(0.184)	-0.321	(0.291)
Party: Radical Left	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-1.414***	(0.150)	-0.263	(0.265)
Party: Other Family	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.408**	(0.157)	-0.188	(0.197)
Incumbent Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.497***	(0.078)	~	~	-0.173	(0.126)
Eurosceptic Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-1.435***	(0.101)	~	~	~	~	-1.451***	(0.206)
Discuss Politics Occ.	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.171**	(0.076)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics Alot	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.100	(0.105)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Knowledge of EU	~	~	~	~	0.140***	(0.017)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.155***	(0.023)
Economic Winner	~	~	1.643***	(0.124)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.606***	(0.164)
Female	-0.123**	(0.063)	-0.143**	(0.064)	-0.036	(0.065)	-0.117*	(0.064)	-0.253***	(0.081)	-0.122*	(0.063)	-0.269***	(0.081)	-0.155*	(0.085)
Married	0.035	(0.077)	0.017	(0.078)	0.026	(0.078)	0.029	(0.078)	0.004	(0.101)	0.034	(0.078)	0.010	(0.100)	-0.008	(0.103)
Age	-0.046***	(0.012)	-0.029**	(0.012)	-0.056***	(0.012)	-0.050***	(0.012)	-0.042***	(0.015)	-0.047***	(0.012)	-0.042***	(0.015)	-0.037**	(0.016)
Age Squared	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.001***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)
Household Size	-0.099***	(0.030)	-0.098***	(0.030)	-0.081***	(0.030)	-0.093***	(0.030)	-0.099**	(0.039)	-0.098***	(0.030)	-0.104***	(0.039)	-0.077*	(0.040)
Education: Secondary	0.155*	(0.085)	0.144*	(0.085)	0.083	(0.086)	0.130	(0.085)	0.151	(0.111)	0.175**	(0.085)	0.152	(0.111)	0.070	(0.115)
Education: University	0.634***	(0.101)	0.589***	(0.102)	0.469***	(0.103)	0.611***	(0.101)	0.611***	(0.131)	0.670***	(0.101)	0.646***	(0.131)	0.379***	(0.137)
Student	0.923***	(0.157)	0.887***	(0.158)	0.640***	(0.161)	0.870***	(0.158)	0.831***	(0.209)	0.966***	(0.158)	0.884***	(0.209)	0.506**	(0.219)
Self employed	0.142	(0.144)	0.166	(0.146)	0.079	(0.145)	0.161	(0.145)	-0.074	(0.179)	0.163	(0.145)	-0.011	(0.181)	-0.078	(0.184)
White-Collar Profess.	0.474***	(0.094)	0.433***	(0.096)	0.428***	(0.096)	0.466***	(0.094)	0.440***	(0.125)	0.483***	(0.094)	0.450***	(0.125)	0.351***	(0.130)
House Person	0.360***	(0.133)	0.403***	(0.135)	0.329**	(0.134)	0.365***	(0.133)	0.158	(0.172)	0.356***	(0.133)	0.180	(0.172)	0.145	(0.178)
Unemployed	-0.072	(0.140)	0.063	(0.141)	-0.093	(0.142)	-0.090	(0.140)	0.071	(0.200)	-0.071	(0.139)	0.116	(0.201)	0.116	(0.208)
Retired	0.076	(0.119)	0.120	(0.120)	0.019	(0.121)	0.064	(0.119)	-0.117	(0.151)	0.090	(0.119)	-0.103	(0.151)	-0.110	(0.156)
Farmer/Fisherman	-0.137	(0.255)	0.049	(0.253)	-0.313	(0.258)	-0.148	(0.255)	-0.501*	(0.298)	-0.117	(0.255)	-0.407	(0.298)	-0.373	(0.301)
Income	0.278***	(0.037)	0.264***	(0.037)	0.240***	(0.037)	0.269***	(0.037)	0.266***	(0.048)	0.276***	(0.037)	0.269***	(0.047)	0.225***	(0.049)

Table 9 Continued

	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7		Full Model	
Denmark	-1.714***	(0.190)	-1.832***	(0.192)	-1.742***	(0.191)	-1.740***	(0.190)	-1.380***	(0.225)	-1.780***	(0.191)	-1.456***	(0.232)	-1.504***	(0.240)
West Germany	-0.972***	(0.200)	-0.892***	(0.200)	-1.071***	(0.201)	-0.984***	(0.202)	-0.947***	(0.242)	-1.072***	(0.202)	-1.001***	(0.244)	-1.037***	(0.250)
Greece	0.161	(0.230)	0.133	(0.231)	0.171	(0.232)	0.133	(0.230)	0.409	(0.287)	0.043	(0.232)	0.262	(0.298)	0.300	(0.305)
Italy	-0.165	(0.232)	-0.268	(0.233)	-0.228	(0.233)	-0.201	(0.232)	0.453	(0.333)	-0.187	(0.233)	0.342	(0.336)	0.280	(0.345)
Spain	0.369	(0.251)	0.149	(0.252)	0.376	(0.252)	0.365	(0.251)	0.470	(0.315)	0.299	(0.253)	0.370	(0.324)	0.191	(0.334)
France	-0.949***	(0.201)	-1.040***	(0.202)	-0.942***	(0.202)	-0.965***	(0.201)	-0.845***	(0.243)	-0.966***	(0.202)	-0.967***	(0.250)	-1.020***	(0.255)
Ireland	0.559*	(0.290)	0.306	(0.296)	0.603**	(0.294)	0.556*	(0.291)	0.604*	(0.350)	0.420	(0.292)	0.453	(0.355)	0.384	(0.378)
Northern Ireland	-0.918***	(0.338)	-1.178***	(0.334)	-0.785**	(0.336)	-0.935***	(0.339)	~	~	-0.877***	(0.338)	~	~	~	~
Luxembourg	0.267	(0.281)	0.181	(0.282)	0.286	(0.285)	0.236	(0.281)	~	~	0.216	(0.282)	~	~	~	~
Holland	0.274	(0.223)	0.192	(0.225)	0.279	(0.224)	0.243	(0.224)	0.479*	(0.266)	0.201	(0.225)	0.378	(0.267)	0.432	(0.276)
Portugal	0.793***	(0.253)	0.674***	(0.254)	0.824***	(0.253)	0.765***	(0.253)	0.773**	(0.300)	0.694***	(0.254)	0.674**	(0.309)	0.677**	(0.317)
Great Britain	-2.079***	(0.209)	-2.285***	(0.212)	-2.052***	(0.210)	-2.091***	(0.209)	-1.836***	(0.247)	-2.214***	(0.211)	-2.276***	(0.255)	-2.041***	(0.273)
East Germany	-1.162***	(0.205)	-1.093***	(0.206)	-1.236***	(0.207)	-1.166***	(0.207)	~	~	-1.230***	(0.206)	~	~	~	~
Finland	-1.679***	(0.192)	-1.800***	(0.193)	-1.686***	(0.193)	-1.697***	(0.193)	-1.626***	(0.228)	-1.754***	(0.193)	-1.633***	(0.236)	-1.764***	(0.243)
Sweden	-2.376***	(0.187)	-2.591***	(0.190)	-2.370***	(0.188)	-2.398***	(0.188)	-2.06***	(0.224)	-2.470***	(0.190)	-2.287***	(0.231)	-2.307***	(0.242)
Austria	-1.842***	(0.198)	-1.857***	(0.200)	-1.965***	(0.204)	-1.860***	(0.200)	-1.630***	(0.236)	-1.911***	(0.200)	-1.680***	(0.237)	-1.799***	(0.249)
Constant	2.463***	(0.326)	0.995***	(0.345)	2.223***	(0.332)	2.478***	(0.328)	2.802***	(0.417)	2.448***	(0.327)	2.977***	(0.425)	1.263***	(0.472)
Log likelihood	-8991.20		-8844.78		-8762.57		-8892.29		-5202.59		-8963.91		-5221.75		-5003.32	
Wald χ^2	1542.2***		1676.0***		1625.1***		1593.3***		950.22***		1564.6***		943.5***		1078.17***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0938		0.1062		0.1034		0.0985		0.1078		0.097		0.1045		0.1300	
No. of observations	10139		10117		10009		10088		6164		10139		6164		6093	

Notes: Coefficient estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The dependent variable corresponds to the following question: "Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union is 1. A Good thing, 2. Neither Good nor Bad, 3.A Bad thing?" Both equations are estimated jointly by multinomial logit with 'the EU is a Bad thing' being the base category. Among the categorical variables the omitted categories are: Socialists, non-incumbent party, Pro-EU party, never discuss politics, male, not married or not cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, and Belgium. The "Economic Winner" variable is scaled on a 0-1 continuum, where 0=Economic Pessimist and 1=Economic Optimist. "Knowledge of the EU" is based on a 1-10 scale where 10=knows about the EU.

Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.

Table 10 CEEB 3003.4 MNL Determinants of Stating the EU is A GOOD THING

Base: EU BAD	Utilitarian Hypotheses				Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses				Political Motivation Hypotheses						Full Model	
	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7			
Party: Conservative	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.591***	(0.260)	1.213***	(0.249)
Party: Liberal	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.472***	(0.150)	0.455**	(0.182)
Party: Religious	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.030**	(0.470)	1.183**	(0.481)
Party: Radical Right	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.371	(0.508)	0.564	(0.469)
Party: Radical Left	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-2.946***	(0.334)	-1.860***	(0.369)
Party: Other Family	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.110	(0.146)	-0.049	(0.160)
Incumbent Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.372***	(0.112)	~	~	0.216	(0.146)
Eurosceptic Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-1.493***	(0.137)	~	~	~	~	-1.091***	(0.153)
Discuss Politics Occ.	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.194**	(0.087)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics Alot	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.027	(0.102)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Knowledge of EU	~	~	~	~	0.276***	(0.025)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.239***	(0.031)
Economic Winner	~	~	2.846***	(0.142)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2.559***	(0.186)
Female	-0.065	(0.080)	-0.028	(0.083)	0.091	(0.082)	-0.070	(0.081)	-0.158	(0.103)	-0.151	(0.101)	-0.183*	(0.103)	-0.036	(0.109)
Married	0.105	(0.092)	0.084	(0.096)	0.102	(0.094)	0.104	(0.092)	0.077	(0.119)	0.053	(0.117)	0.041	(0.121)	0.026	(0.129)
Age	-0.031**	(0.014)	0.022	(0.015)	-0.033**	(0.014)	-0.034**	(0.014)	-0.021	(0.018)	-0.019	(0.018)	-0.015	(0.018)	0.026	(0.019)
Age Squared	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Household Size	-0.075*	(0.039)	-0.049	(0.041)	-0.049	(0.040)	-0.071*	(0.039)	-0.001	(0.051)	-0.017	(0.050)	-0.014	(0.051)	0.052	(0.056)
Education: Secondary	0.410***	(0.107)	0.421***	(0.110)	0.225**	(0.111)	0.414***	(0.108)	0.170	(0.138)	0.190	(0.136)	0.224	(0.137)	0.091	(0.148)
Education: University	0.771***	(0.131)	0.701***	(0.136)	0.451***	(0.137)	0.768***	(0.134)	0.637***	(0.170)	0.647***	(0.168)	0.638***	(0.171)	0.344*	(0.186)
Student	0.939***	(0.222)	0.849***	(0.231)	0.639***	(0.229)	0.928***	(0.223)	0.738***	(0.280)	0.753***	(0.279)	0.761***	(0.281)	0.383	(0.298)
Self employed	0.275	(0.190)	0.141	(0.201)	0.258	(0.193)	0.272	(0.190)	0.325	(0.231)	0.334	(0.230)	0.206	(0.233)	0.101	(0.255)
White-Collar Profess.	0.421***	(0.136)	0.301**	(0.142)	0.365***	(0.139)	0.423***	(0.136)	0.457***	(0.174)	0.509***	(0.172)	0.455***	(0.175)	0.265	(0.186)
House Person	0.235	(0.169)	0.188	(0.178)	0.278	(0.175)	0.241	(0.169)	0.230	(0.217)	0.211	(0.213)	0.163	(0.217)	0.151	(0.241)
Unemployed	-0.204	(0.149)	-0.050	(0.154)	-0.187	(0.151)	-0.212	(0.149)	-0.131	(0.191)	-0.107	(0.189)	-0.095	(0.190)	0.004	(0.204)
Retired	-0.052	(0.137)	-0.010	(0.141)	-0.070	(0.141)	-0.043	(0.137)	0.129	(0.174)	0.101	(0.173)	0.119	(0.176)	0.150	(0.188)
Farmer/Fisherman	-0.212	(0.231)	-0.172	(0.244)	-0.090	(0.241)	-0.222	(0.232)	0.062	(0.309)	0.054	(0.300)	-0.112	(0.310)	-0.100	(0.327)
Income	0.076***	(0.017)	0.017	(0.019)	0.050***	(0.018)	0.071***	(0.018)	0.045**	(0.022)	0.070***	(0.022)	0.056**	(0.022)	-0.034	(0.026)

Table 10 Continued

	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7		Full Model	
Cyprus	-1.338***	(0.264)	-1.749***	(0.273)	-1.730***	(0.270)	-1.329***	(0.264)	-0.467	(0.381)	-1.251***	(0.358)	-3.720***	(0.476)	-2.932***	(0.535)
Czech Republic	-2.126***	(0.229)	-2.268***	(0.231)	-2.287***	(0.232)	-2.158***	(0.230)	-1.298***	(0.318)	-1.849***	(0.317)	-3.093***	(0.367)	-2.518***	(0.379)
Estonia	-2.571***	(0.222)	-3.022***	(0.227)	-2.650***	(0.224)	-2.603***	(0.223)	-1.268***	(0.331)	-2.292***	(0.309)	-4.751***	(0.435)	-3.811***	(0.452)
Hungary	-1.375***	(0.235)	-1.588***	(0.237)	-1.441***	(0.237)	-1.360***	(0.235)	-0.365	(0.337)	-1.324***	(0.324)	-3.353***	(0.445)	-2.435***	(0.443)
Latvia	-2.289***	(0.221)	-2.818***	(0.227)	-2.538***	(0.226)	-2.325***	(0.222)	-1.930***	(0.308)	-2.014***	(0.310)	-4.141***	(0.430)	-4.108***	(0.416)
Lithuania	-1.521***	(0.233)	-1.854***	(0.238)	-1.525***	(0.237)	-1.539***	(0.234)	-1.306***	(0.330)	-1.344***	(0.331)	-3.390***	(0.444)	-3.008***	(0.431)
Malta	-1.612***	(0.264)	-2.131***	(0.268)	-2.108***	(0.272)	-1.619***	(0.264)	-0.979***	(0.330)	-1.705***	(0.351)	-4.388***	(0.476)	-3.786***	(0.476)
Poland	-1.939***	(0.226)	-2.031***	(0.231)	-2.188***	(0.231)	-1.951***	(0.227)	-1.410***	(0.327)	-1.733***	(0.324)	-3.720***	(0.447)	-3.152***	(0.435)
Romania	0.529*	(0.310)	0.318	(0.315)	0.499	(0.317)	0.531*	(0.310)	1.190***	(0.455)	0.755*	(0.455)	-1.150**	(0.540)	-0.654	(0.535)
Slovakia	-1.260***	(0.239)	-1.191***	(0.241)	-1.515***	(0.243)	-1.271***	(0.240)	-0.820***	(0.326)	-1.328***	(0.318)	-3.472***	(0.441)	-2.556***	(0.433)
Slovenia	-1.318***	(0.253)	-1.753***	(0.257)	-1.709***	(0.258)	-1.337***	(0.254)	-0.837**	(0.369)	-0.971***	(0.373)	-2.946***	(0.476)	-2.987***	(0.464)
Turkey	-1.375***	(0.238)	-1.870***	(0.246)	-1.485***	(0.242)	-1.367***	(0.239)	-1.424***	(0.314)	-1.582***	(0.318)	-3.514***	(0.436)	-3.341***	(0.420)
Constant	3.458***	(0.410)	1.197***	(0.442)	2.622***	(0.420)	3.475***	(0.411)	3.215***	(0.558)	3.058***	(0.552)	4.959***	(0.627)	1.523**	(0.658)
Log likelihood	-7368.87		-7008.98		-7052.45		-7332.47		-4372.94		-4440.81		-4342.302		-3968.257	
Wald χ^2	955.3***		1360.2***		1188.8**		984.64***		661.36***		548.9***		673.59***		1073.39***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0751		0.1184		0.1012		0.0772		0.0863		0.0721		0.0927		0.1600	
No. of observations	9027		9007		8918		9002		5605		5605		5605		5541	

Notes: Coefficient estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The dependent variable corresponds to the following question: "Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union would be 1. A Good thing, 2. Neither Good nor Bad, 3.A Bad thing?" Both equations are estimated jointly by multinomial logit with 'the EU is a Bad thing' being the base category. Among the categorical variables the omitted categories are: Socialists, non-incumbent party, pro-EU party, never discuss politics, male, not married or not cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, and Bulgaria. The "Economic Winner" variable is scaled on a 0-1 continuum, where 0=Economic Pessimist and 1=Economic Optimist. "Knowledge of the EU" is based on a 1-10 scale where 10=knows about the EU. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.

Table 11 EB 53 MNL Determinants of Stating the EU is NEITHER A GOOD OR BAD THING

Base: EU Bad	Utilitarian Hypotheses				Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses				Political Motivation Hypotheses						Full Model	
	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7			
Party: Conservative	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.276**	(0.138)	-0.231	(0.162)
Party: Liberal	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.261*	(0.140)	-0.325*	(0.173)
Party: Religious	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.317**	(0.161)	-0.352**	(0.172)
Party: Radical Right	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.953***	(0.185)	-0.099	(0.293)
Party: Radical Left	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.607***	(0.157)	0.175	(0.268)
Party: Other Family	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.301*	(0.169)	-0.133	(0.208)
Incumbent Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.184**	(0.083)	~	~	-0.143	(0.134)
Eurosceptic Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.753***	(0.105)	~	~	~	~	-0.997***	(0.206)
Discuss Politics Occ.	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.308***	(0.078)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics Alot	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.638***	(0.113)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Knowledge of EU	~	~	~	~	-0.044**	(0.018)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.007	(0.024)
Economic Winner	~	~	0.467***	(0.127)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.481***	(0.170)
Female	0.152**	(0.067)	0.143**	(0.067)	0.120*	(0.069)	0.092	(0.068)	0.057	(0.088)	0.154**	(0.067)	0.043	(0.088)	0.047	(0.092)
Married	0.002	(0.082)	0.001	(0.082)	-0.001	(0.083)	0.001	(0.082)	-0.102	(0.109)	0.001	(0.082)	-0.093	(0.108)	-0.103	(0.110)
Age	-0.041***	(0.012)	-0.037***	(0.012)	-0.041***	(0.012)	-0.036***	(0.012)	-0.033**	(0.0159)	-0.042***	(0.012)	-0.035**	(0.016)	-0.034**	(0.016)
Age Squared	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)
Household Size	-0.088***	(0.032)	-0.089***	(0.032)	-0.091***	(0.032)	-0.090***	(0.032)	-0.053	(0.042)	-0.089***	(0.032)	-0.055	(0.042)	-0.051	(0.043)
Education: Secondary	-0.020	(0.087)	-0.028	(0.087)	-0.002	(0.089)	-0.004	(0.087)	-0.097	(0.115)	-0.010	(0.087)	-0.090	(0.115)	-0.076	(0.118)
Education: University	-0.034	(0.106)	-0.044	(0.106)	-0.005	(0.109)	0.024	(0.107)	-0.185	(0.138)	-0.017	(0.107)	-0.156	(0.139)	-0.198	(0.144)
Student	-0.003	(0.165)	-0.024	(0.167)	0.039	(0.170)	0.074	(0.167)	-0.231	(0.222)	0.019	(0.166)	-0.191	(0.222)	-0.274	(0.232)
Self employed	-0.130	(0.156)	-0.112	(0.156)	-0.127	(0.157)	-0.083	(0.158)	-0.289	(0.198)	-0.120	(0.156)	-0.223	(0.200)	-0.250	(0.201)
White-Collar Profess.	0.056	(0.102)	0.042	(0.102)	0.085	(0.103)	0.073	(0.102)	-0.032	(0.137)	0.061	(0.102)	-0.20	(0.137)	-0.047	(0.141)
House Person	0.200	(0.137)	0.220	(0.138)	0.199	(0.139)	0.194	(0.138)	-0.029	(0.179)	0.200	(0.137)	-0.002	(0.179)	-0.027	(0.182)
Unemployed	-0.163	(0.141)	-0.128	(0.141)	-0.164	(0.142)	-0.160	(0.142)	-0.149	(0.211)	-0.167	(0.141)	-0.119	(0.211)	-0.158	(0.214)
Retired	-0.103	(0.124)	-0.086	(0.123)	-0.126	(0.126)	-0.101	(0.124)	-0.227	(0.160)	-0.097	(0.123)	-0.214	(0.161)	-0.238	(0.163)
Farmer/Fisherman	-0.522*	(0.277)	-0.452	(0.275)	-0.618**	(0.283)	-0.530*	(0.277)	-0.804**	(0.335)	-0.520*	(0.277)	-0.721**	(0.338)	-0.762**	(0.343)
Income	0.095**	(0.039)	0.094**	(0.039)	0.103**	(0.040)	0.110***	(0.039)	0.113**	(0.051)	0.096**	(0.039)	0.120**	(0.052)	0.124**	(0.053)

Table 11 Continued

	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7		Full Model	
Denmark	-1.376***	(0.208)	-1.406***	(0.208)	-1.332***	(0.208)	-1.297***	(0.209)	-1.121***	(0.247)	-1.402***	(0.208)	-1.218***	(0.254)	-1.132***	(0.260)
West Germany	-0.409*	(0.213)	-0.387*	(0.212)	-0.415*	(0.214)	-0.281	(0.215)	-0.505*	(0.261)	-0.443**	(0.214)	-0.533**	(0.263)	-0.484*	(0.268)
Greece	0.146	(0.245)	0.145	(0.245)	0.167	(0.246)	0.248	(0.246)	0.393	(0.307)	0.109	(0.247)	0.281	(0.318)	0.358	(0.323)
Italy	-0.062	(0.247)	-0.088	(0.247)	-0.032	(0.248)	0.014	(0.249)	0.547	(0.349)	-0.068	(0.247)	0.481	(0.352)	0.568	(0.357)
Spain	0.104	(0.268)	0.037	(0.268)	0.106	(0.269)	0.077	(0.269)	0.263	(0.336)	0.084	(0.269)	0.182	(0.346)	0.148	(0.352)
France	-0.421**	(0.214)	-0.445**	(0.214)	-0.399*	(0.215)	-0.410*	(0.215)	-0.533**	(0.264)	-0.428**	(0.215)	-0.639**	(0.270)	-0.633**	(0.273)
Ireland	-0.457	(0.331)	-0.522	(0.332)	-0.458	(0.331)	-0.429	(0.333)	-0.553	(0.408)	-0.505	(0.331)	-0.585	(0.416)	-0.535	(0.426)
Northern Ireland	-0.330	(0.349)	-0.412	(0.349)	-0.367	(0.350)	-0.268	(0.350)	~	~	-0.317	(0.349)	~	~	~	~
Luxembourg	-0.433	(0.316)	-0.463	(0.316)	-0.402	(0.320)	-0.365	(0.317)	~	~	-0.448	(0.316)	~	~	~	~
Holland	-0.247	(0.244)	-0.266	(0.244)	-0.252	(0.244)	-0.197	(0.245)	-0.055	(0.292)	-0.272	(0.245)	-0.148	(0.294)	-0.066	(0.299)
Portugal	0.607**	(0.267)	0.570**	(0.267)	0.593**	(0.268)	0.615**	(0.268)	0.503	(0.319)	0.579**	(0.268)	0.377	(0.328)	0.428	(0.335)
Great Britain	-1.084***	(0.217)	-1.138***	(0.218)	-1.092***	(0.217)	-1.052***	(0.217)	-0.862***	(0.260)	-1.131***	(0.219)	-1.157***	(0.268)	-0.886***	(0.285)
East Germany	0.127	(0.211)	0.147	(0.211)	0.148	(0.212)	0.283	(0.214)	~	~	0.106	(0.212)	~	~	~	~
Finland	-0.664***	(0.203)	-0.701***	(0.203)	-0.616***	(0.204)	-0.578***	(0.204)	-0.563**	(0.243)	-0.693***	(0.204)	0.578**	(0.251)	-0.587**	(0.257)
Sweden	-1.551***	(0.200)	-1.610***	(0.200)	-1.545***	(0.200)	-1.482***	(0.201)	-1.271***	(0.241)	-1.587***	(0.201)	-1.439***	(0.248)	-1.328***	(0.256)
Austria	-0.775***	(0.207)	-0.772***	(0.207)	-0.716***	(0.212)	-0.636***	(0.209)	-0.700***	(0.250)	-0.798***	(0.208)	-0.728***	(0.251)	-0.669**	(0.259)
Constant	2.124***	(0.342)	1.721***	(0.359)	2.260***	(0.348)	2.151***	(0.345)	2.132***	(0.446)	2.121***	(0.342)	2.314***	(0.454)	2.024***	(0.497)
Log likelihood	-8991.20		-8844.78		-8762.57		-8892.29		-5202.59		-8963.91		-5221.75		-5003.32	
Wald χ^2	1542.2***		1676.0***		1625.1***		1593.3***		950.22***		1564.5***		943.5***		1078.17***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0938		0.1062		0.1034		0.0985		0.1078		0.097		0.1045		0.1300	
No. of observations	10139		10117		10009		10088		6164		10139		6164		6093	

Notes: Coefficient estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The dependent variable corresponds to the following question: "Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union is 1. A Good thing, 2. Neither Good nor Bad, 3.A Bad thing?" Both equations are estimated jointly by multinomial logit with 'the EU is a Bad thing' being the base category. Among the categorical variables the omitted categories are: Socialists, non-incumbent party, Pro-EU party, never discuss politics, male, not married or not cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, and Belgium. The "Economic Winner" variable is scaled on a 0-1 continuum, where 0=Economic Pessimist and 1=Economic Optimist. "Knowledge of the EU" is based on a 1-10 scale where 10=knows about the EU. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.

Table 12 CEEB 2003.4 MNL Determinants of Stating the EU is NEITHER A GOOD OR BAD THING

Base: EU BAD	Utilitarian Hypotheses				Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses				Political Motivation Hypotheses						Full Model	
	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7			
Party: Conservative	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.940***	(0.289)	0.533**	(0.263)
Party: Liberal	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.227	(0.166)	0.223	(0.192)
Party: Religious	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.311	(0.502)	0.247	(0.515)
Party: Radical Right	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.387	(0.526)	0.219	(0.513)
Party: Radical Left	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-1.522***	(0.330)	-1.030***	(0.349)
Party: Other Family	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.013	(0.162)	-0.078	(0.171)
Incumbent Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.139	(0.122)	~	~	-0.033	(0.1540
Eurosceptic Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.732***	(0.147)	~	~	~	~	-0.428***	(0.160)
Discuss Politics Occ.	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.009	(0.092)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics Alot	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.345***	(0.111)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Knowledge of EU	~	~	~	~	0.007	(0.026)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.003	(0.032)
Economic Winner	~	~	1.090***	(0.143)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.028***	(0.189)
Female	0.344***	(0.085)	0.360***	(0.086)	0.358***	(0.086)	0.307***	(0.086)	0.217**	(0.111)	0.227**	(0.110)	0.202*	(0.110)	0.218*	(0.113)
Married	0.047	(0.097)	0.039	(0.099)	0.040	(0.098)	0.056	(0.098)	0.091	(0.129)	0.078	(0.127)	0.076	(0.130)	0.066	(0.133)
Age	-0.003	(0.015)	0.017	(0.015)	-0.001	(0.015)	-0.002	(0.015)	0.013	(0.020)	0.014	(0.020)	0.018	(0.019)	0.036*	(0.020)
Age Squared	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)
Household Size	0.009	(0.0410	0.013	(0.042)	0.014	(0.042)	0.010	(0.041)	0.063	(0.054)	0.053	(0.054)	0.056	(0.055)	0.074	(0.057)
Education: Secondary	0.224**	(0.113)	0.213	(0.113)	0.223*	(0.117)	0.253**	(0.114)	0.080	(0.151)	0.089	(0.149)	0.106	(0.149)	0.088	(0.157)
Education: University	0.072	(0.140)	0.042	(0.142)	0.058	(0.145)	0.128	(0.143)	0.104	(0.185)	0.109	(0.183)	0.111	(0.186)	0.079	(0.196)
Student	0.304	(0.237)	0.232	(0.241)	0.320	(0.242)	0.341	(0.238)	0.397	(0.303)	0.403	(0.303)	0.399	(0.304)	0.301	(0.315)
Self employed	-0.042	(0.209)	-0.077	(0.213)	-0.025	(0.211)	-0.045	(0.210)	0.038	(0.256)	0.048	(0.257)	-0.049	(0.258)	-0.054	(0.265)
White-Collar Profess.	0.058	(0.145)	-0.003	(0.147)	0.058	(0.146)	0.063	(0.145)	0.052	(0.186)	0.080	(0.185)	0.036	(0.186)	-0.042	(0.192)
House Person	-0.030	(0.182)	-0.072	(0.185)	0.005	(0.186)	-0.036	(0.182)	0.179	(0.236)	0.168	(0.234)	0.143	(0.238)	0.104	(0.248)
Unemployed	-0.139	(0.156)	-0.093	(0.157)	-0.149	(0.157)	-0.147	(0.156)	-0.071	(0.204)	-0.061	(0.202)	-0.052	(0.201)	-0.052	(0.208)
Retired	-0.035	(0.145)	-0.026	(0.147)	-0.038	(0.149)	-0.026	(0.146)	0.128	(0.189)	0.114	(0.188)	0.123	(0.190)	0.135	(0.196)
Farmer/Fisherman	-0.625**	(0.276)	-0.613**	(0.278)	-0.585**	(0.281)	-0.615**	(0.276)	-0.760*	(0.390)	-0.768**	(0.383)	-0.856**	(0.388)	-0.863**	(0.396)
Income	0.010	(0.018)	-0.009	(0.019)	0.010	(0.019)	0.010	(0.018)	-0.012	(0.024)	0.001	(0.023)	-0.008	(0.024)	-0.034	(0.026)

Table 12 Continued

	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7		Full Model	
Cyprus	-0.731***	(0.282)	-0.868***	(0.285)	-0.774***	(0.284)	-0.714**	(0.282)	-0.302	(0.404)	-0.754**	(0.385)	-2.225***	(0.487)	-1.477***	(0.536)
Czech Republic	-0.834***	(0.244)	-0.882***	(0.244)	-0.848***	(0.246)	-0.829***	(0.245)	-0.439	(0.342)	-0.780**	(0.339)	-1.401***	(0.366)	-0.920**	(0.370)
Estonia	-0.950***	(0.234)	-1.111***	(0.236)	-0.952***	(0.236)	-0.932***	(0.235)	-0.225	(0.351)	-0.785**	(0.327)	-2.266***	(0.438)	-1.624***	(0.454)
Hungary	-0.761***	(0.250)	-0.833***	(0.250)	-0.761***	(0.251)	-0.742***	(0.250)	-0.471	(0.363)	-0.985***	(0.349)	-2.259***	(0.455)	-1.686***	(0.454)
Latvia	-1.130***	(0.235)	-1.324***	(0.237)	-1.133***	(0.237)	-1.117***	(0.236)	-1.018***	(0.330)	-1.047***	(0.332)	-2.375***	(0.436)	-2.063***	(0.415)
Lithuania	-0.728***	(0.251)	-0.849***	(0.252)	-0.690***	(0.254)	-0.723***	(0.252)	-0.750**	(0.357)	-0.765**	(0.357)	-2.050***	(0.455)	-1.686***	(0.439)
Malta	-1.356***	(0.292)	-1.525***	(0.294)	-1.379***	(0.298)	-1.334***	(0.293)	-1.526***	(0.393)	-1.920***	(0.411)	-3.552***	(0.526)	-2.597***	(0.501)
Poland	-0.939***	(0.242)	-0.963***	(0.243)	-0.921***	(0.246)	-0.937***	(0.243)	-0.842**	(0.353)	-1.036***	(0.350)	-2.324***	(0.460)	-1.713***	(0.442)
Romania	-0.162	(0.334)	-0.234	(0.335)	-0.115	(0.339)	-0.175	(0.334)	0.125	(0.488)	-0.119	(0.490)	-1.369**	(0.564)	-0.914*	(0.555)
Slovakia	-0.380	(0.253)	-0.343	(0.253)	-0.379	(0.256)	-0.348	(0.254)	-0.144	(0.347)	-0.461	(0.338)	-1.757***	(0.446)	-1.035**	(0.436)
Slovenia	0.002	(0.264)	-0.163	(0.265)	-0.020	(0.268)	0.009	(0.265)	0.217	(0.388)	0.167	(0.390)	-1.093**	(0.480)	-0.772*	(0.463)
Turkey	-1.250***	(0.259)	-1.426***	(0.261)	-1.232***	(0.262)	-1.214***	(0.261)	-1.466***	(0.348)	-1.526***	(0.351)	-2.762***	(0.451)	-2.435***	(0.426)
Constant	1.575***	(0.437)	0.818*	(0.455)	1.475***	(0.445)	1.568***	(0.438)	1.155*	(0.600)	1.084*	(0.597)	2.259***	(0.657)	1.145*	(0.668)
Log likelihood	-7368.87		-7008.98		-7052.45		-7332.47		-4372.94		-4440.81		-4342.302		-3968.257	
Wald χ^2	955.3***		1360.2***		1188.8***		984.6***		661.36***		548.94***		673.59***		1073.4***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0751		0.1184		0.1012		0.0772		0.0863		0.0721		0.0927		0.1600	
No. of observations	9027		9007		8918		9002		5605		5605		5605		5541	

Notes: Coefficient estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The dependent variable corresponds to the following question: "Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union would be 1. A Good thing, 2. Neither Good nor Bad, 3.A Bad thing?" Both equations are estimated jointly by multinomial logit with 'the EU is a Bad thing' being the base category. Among the categorical variables the omitted categories are: Socialists, non-incumbent party, pro-EU party, never discuss politics, male, not married or not cohabiting, primary education, manual worker, and Bulgaria. The "Economic Winner" variable is scaled on a 0-1 continuum, where 0=Economic Pessimist and 1=Economic Optimist. "Knowledge of the EU" is based on a 1-10 scale where 10=knows about the EU. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.

Table 13 EU-28 MNL Determinants of Stating the EU is A GOOD THING

Base: EU BAD	Utilitarian Hypotheses				Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses				Political Motivation Hypotheses						Full Model	
	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7			
Party: Conservative	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.505***	(0.183)	0.567***	(0.207)
Party: Liberal	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.200***	(0.167)	0.288	(0.196)
Party: Religious	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.255***	(0.186)	0.361*	(0.211)
Party: Socialist	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1.226***	(0.159)	0.212	(0.195)
Party: Radical Left	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.340*	(0.187)	-0.295	(0.195)
Party: Other	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.848***	(0.169)	0.038	(0.191)
Incumbent Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.452***	(0.064)	~	~	0.185**	(0.081)
Eurosceptic Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-1.454***	(0.080)	~	~	~	~	-1.162***	(0.108)
Discuss Politics Occ.	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.164***	(0.056)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics Alot	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.054	(0.073)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Knowledge of EU	~	~	~	~	0.196***	(0.014)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.190***	(0.018)
Economic Winner	~	~	2.166***	(0.091))	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2.079***	(0.118)
Female	-0.113**	(0.049)	-0.117**	(0.050)	0.009	(0.050)	-0.112**	(0.050)	-0.219***	(0.063)	-0.137**	(0.053)	-0.221***	(0.063)	-0.103	(0.066)
Married	0.077	(0.059)	0.062	(0.060)	0.070	(0.060)	0.073	(0.059)	0.046	(0.076)	0.051	(0.064)	0.022	(0.075)	0.021	(0.079)
Age	-0.040***	(0.009)	-0.009	(0.009)	-0.048***	(0.009)	-0.043***	(0.009)	-0.031***	(0.011)	-0.039***	(0.010)	-0.028**	(0.011)	-0.010	(0.012)
Age Squared	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000***	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Household Size	-0.090***	(0.024)	-0.079***	(0.025)	-0.069***	(0.025)	-0.085***	(0.024)	-0.062*	(0.032)	-0.077***	(0.026)	-0.067**	(0.0320	-0.026	(0.033)
Education: Secondary	0.264***	(0.066)	0.260***	(0.067)	0.153**	(0.068)	0.251***	(0.066)	0.157*	(0.086)	0.185**	(0.071)	0.162*	(0.085)	0.059	(0.089)
Education: University	0.694***	(0.080)	0.637***	(0.081)	0.470***	(0.082)	0.679***	(0.080)	0.615***	(0.102)	0.661***	(0.086)	0.631***	(0.102)	0.359***	(0.108)
Student	0.917***	(0.127)	0.857***	(0.130)	0.600***	(0.130)	0.882***	(0.128)	0.761***	(0.166)	0.892***	(0.137)	0.780***	(0.166)	0.390**	(0.175)
Self employed	0.200*	(0.113)	0.175	(0.117)	0.144	(0.114)	0.211*	(0.114)	0.097	(0.140)	0.225*	(0.121)	0.080	(0.140)	0.003	(0.146)
White-Collar Profess.	0.463***	(0.077)	0.398***	(0.079)	0.405***	(0.078)	0.458***	(0.077)	0.461***	(0.101)	0.497***	(0.082)	0.459***	(0.101)	0.338***	(0.106)
House Person	0.317***	(0.103)	0.347***	(0.106)	0.299***	(0.106)	0.324***	(0.103)	0.181	(0.134)	0.304***	(0.112)	0.153	(0.133)	0.155	(0.141)
Unemployed	-0.126	(0.100)	0.040	(0.102)	-0.148	(0.102)	-0.139	(0.100)	-0.054	(0.137)	-0.085	(0.111)	-0.038	(0.137)	0.062	(0.143)
Retired	0.018	(0.089)	0.069	(0.091)	-0.027	(0.091)	0.014	(0.089)	-0.009	(0.114)	0.082	(0.097)	-0.027	(0.114)	0.011	(0.118)
Farmer/Fisherman	-0.152	(0.169)	0.006	(0.172)	-0.191	(0.174)	-0.164	(0.169)	-0.163	(0.213)	0.005	(0.191)	-0.201	(0.213)	-0.129	(0.218)
Income	0.226***	(0.028)	0.172***	(0.028)	0.178***	(0.028)	0.218***	(0.028)	0.185***	(0.035)	0.231***	(0.030)	0.195***	(0.035)	0.086**	(0.037)
Survey CCEB	-0.460*	(0.2370	-0.109	(0.244)	-0.699***	(0.240)	-0.442*	(0.238)	-0.102	(0.258)	-0.725***	(0.250)	-0.779***	(0.288)	0.025	(0.339)

Table 13 Continued

	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7		Full Model	
Denmark	-1.695***	(0.188)	-1.857***	(0.192)	-1.756***	(0.191)	-1.718***	(0.188)	-1.342***	(0.221)	-1.752***	(0.189)	-1.390***	(0.224)	-1.592***	0.237
West Germany	-0.964***	(0.200)	-0.866***	(0.202)	-1.108***	(0.202)	-0.973***	(0.202)	-0.950***	(0.240)	-1.057***	(0.201)	-0.935***	(0.239)	-1.081***	0.250
Greece	0.161	(0.227)	0.149	(0.230)	0.156	(0.230)	0.145	(0.228)	0.322	(0.280)	0.021	(0.228)	0.230	(0.287)	0.204	0.301
Italy	-0.162	(0.231)	-0.305	(0.234)	-0.249	(0.234)	-0.189	(0.231)	0.406	(0.330)	-0.202	(0.232)	0.263	(0.331)	0.136	0.347
Spain	0.391	(0.250)	0.095	(0.251)	0.401	(0.252)	0.391	(0.250)	0.431	(0.312)	0.290	(0.251)	0.387	(0.319)	0.073	0.328
France	-0.967***	(0.200)	-1.098***	(0.204)	-0.967***	(0.202)	-0.982***	(0.200)	-0.856***	(0.241)	-0.975***	(0.201)	-0.910***	(0.245)	-0.996***	(0.253)
Ireland	0.552*	(0.289)	0.232	(0.299)	0.610**	(0.294)	0.554*	(0.290)	0.557	(0.345)	0.412	(0.290)	0.294	(0.346)	0.078	(0.370)
Northern Ireland	-0.917***	(0.336)	-1.261***	(0.334)	-0.732**	(0.336)	-0.931***	(0.338)	~	~	-0.885***	(0.336)	~	~	~	~
Luxembourg	0.248	(0.281)	0.116	(0.284)	0.266	(0.286)	0.220	(0.281)	~	~	0.197	(0.282)	~	~	~	~
Holland	0.268	(0.222)	0.155	(0.225)	0.273	(0.225)	0.237	(0.223)	0.464*	(0.264)	0.207	(0.223)	0.439*	(0.264)	0.366	(0.274)
Portugal	0.806***	(0.252)	0.637**	(0.255)	0.845***	(0.253)	0.785***	(0.252)	0.695**	(0.297)	0.665***	(0.253)	0.711**	(0.304)	0.510	(0.317)
Great Britain	-2.066***	(0.208)	-2.349***	(0.213)	-2.039***	(0.211)	-2.076***	(0.208)	-1.813***	(0.245)	-2.192***	(0.209)	-2.246***	(0.250)	-2.257***	(0.263)
East Germany	-1.162***	(0.204)	-1.083***	(0.206)	-1.277***	(0.208)	-1.161***	(0.206)	~	~	-1.218***	(0.205)	~	~	~	~
Finland	-1.652***	(0.190)	-1.810***	(0.194)	-1.685***	(0.193)	-1.669***	(0.191)	-1.585***	(0.225)	-1.716***	(0.192)	-1.583***	(0.230)	-1.822***	(0.241)
Sweden	-2.370***	(0.186)	-2.679***	(0.191)	-2.380***	(0.189)	-2.390***	(0.187)	-2.037***	(0.221)	-2.448***	(0.188)	-2.222***	(0.224)	-2.445***	(0.239)
Austria	-1.856***	(0.197)	-1.899***	(0.201)	-2.055***	(0.204)	-1.869***	(0.199)	-1.644***	(0.234)	-1.911***	(0.198)	-1.663***	(0.232)	-1.905***	(0.247)
Bulgaria	1.629***	(0.258)	1.644***	(0.265)	1.961***	(0.261)	1.641***	(0.259)	0.974***	(0.324)	1.781***	(0.333)	2.659***	(0.349)	1.605***	(0.406)
Cyprus	0.300	(0.239)	-0.533**	(0.213)	0.357	(0.241)	0.314	(0.239)	0.504*	(0.292)	0.528*	(0.286)	0.363	(0.293)	-0.186	(0.307
Czech Republic	-0.430**	(0.206)	-1.242***	(0.209)	-0.215	(0.207)	-0.445**	(0.207)	-0.337	(0.223)	-0.047	(0.232)	0.337	(0.251)	-0.763**	(0.300)
Estonia	-0.929***	(0.200)	0.124	(0.220)	-0.644***	(0.202)	-0.943***	(0.200)	-0.364	(0.223)	-0.567**	(0.223)	-0.563**	(0.237)	0.362	(0.311)
Hungary	0.292	(0.214)	-1.019***	(0.208)	0.572***	(0.216)	0.314	(0.214)	0.599**	(0.245)	0.465*	(0.250)	0.534**	(0.268)	-1.228***	(0.309)
Latvia	-0.702***	(0.200)	-0.100	(0.220)	-0.516**	(0.202)	-0.716***	(0.200)	-1.016***	(0.216)	-0.327	(0.223)	-0.238	(0.246)	-0.254	(0.331)
Lithuania	0.100	(0.212)	-0.395	(0.243)	0.463	(0.216)	0.102	(0.213)	-0.365	(0.247)	0.411	(0.257)	0.477*	(0.277)	-0.697**	(0.319)
Poland	-0.203	(0.208)	-0.272	(0.216)	-0.051	(0.211)	-0.204	(0.208)	-0.363	(0.246)	0.135	(0.252)	0.457	(0.279)	-0.321	(0.329)
Romania	2.149***	(0.295)	2.001***	(0.303)	2.476***	(0.302)	2.165***	(0.295)	2.183***	(0.402)	2.526***	(0.403)	2.859***	(0.419)	2.193***	(0.461)
Slovakia	0.451**	(0.219)	0.509**	(0.227)	0.594***	(0.221)	0.452**	(0.220)	0.175	(0.236)	0.506**	(0.244)	0.617**	(0.263)	0.304	(0.315)
Slovenia	0.295	(0.236)	-0.007	(0.242)	0.360	(0.236)	0.293	(0.236)	0.093	(0.303)	0.748**	(0.309)	0.931***	(0.329)	-0.193	(0.377)
Turkey	0.330	(0.207)	-0.086	(0.215)	0.581***	(0.211)	0.337	(0.207)	-0.325	(0.219)	0.307	(0.225)	0.506**	(0.252)	-0.544*	(0.315)
Constant	2.366***	(0.274)	0.350	(0.290)	1.877***	(0.279)	2.368***	(0.275)	2.616***	(0.346)	2.329***	(0.290)	1.324***	(0.363)	-0.086	(0.408)
Log likelihood	-16380.28		-15904.03		-15849.33		-16252.84		-9592.12		-13422.14		-9637.07		-9047.46	
Wald χ^2	2601.8***		3093.8***		2875.9***		2672.5***		1676.4***		2226.3***		1638.3***		2104.1***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0886		0.1129		0.1047		0.0915		0.1006		0.0929		0.0964		0.1401	
No. of observations	19166		19124		18927		19090		11769		15744		11769		11634	

Table 14 EU-28 MNL Determinants of Stating the EU is NEITHER A GOOD OR BAD THING

Base: EU BAD	Utilitarian Hypotheses				Cognitive Mobilisation Hypotheses				Political Motivation Hypotheses						Full Model	
	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7			
Party: Conservative	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.794***	(0.196)	0.256	(0.214)
Party: Liberal	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.680***	(0.179)	0.197	(0.205)
Party: Religious	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.569***	(0.201)	0.030	(0.223)
Party: Socialist	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.788***	(0.169)	0.243	(0.204)
Party: Radical Left	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.134	(0.195)	0.152	(0.197)
Party: Other	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.557***	(0.180)	0.100	(0.200)
Incumbent Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.174**	(0.068)	~	~	0.063	(0.087)
Eurosceptic Party	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.735***	(0.084)	~	~	~	~	-0.658***	(0.112)
Discuss Politics Occ.	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.172***	(0.059)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Discuss Politics Alot	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.471***	(0.079)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
Knowledge of EU	~	~	~	~	-0.028*	(0.015)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	-0.009	(0.019)
Economic Winner	~	~	0.681***	(0.092)	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	0.710***	(0.121)
Female	0.224***	(0.052)	0.217***	(0.052)	0.212***	(0.053)	0.178***	(0.053)	0.118*	(0.068)	0.172***	(0.057)	0.116*	(0.068)	0.110	(0.070)
Married	0.026	(0.062)	0.022	(0.063)	0.021	(0.063)	0.031	(0.062)	-0.004	(0.082)	0.034	(0.068)	-0.014	(0.082)	-0.018	(0.083)
Age	-0.025***	(0.009)	-0.016*	(0.009)	-0.024**	(0.009)	-0.021**	(0.009)	-0.011	(0.012)	-0.026**	(0.010)	-0.011	(0.012)	-0.005	(0.013)
Age Squared	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Household Size	-0.048*	(0.026)	-0.047*	(0.026)	-0.047*	(0.026)	-0.049*	(0.026)	-0.008	(0.034)	-0.051*	(0.028)	-0.009	(0.034)	-0.001	(0.035)
Education: Secondary	0.078	(0.068)	0.068	(0.069)	0.095	(0.070)	0.101	(0.069)	-0.029	(0.091)	0.020	(0.075)	-0.030	(0.090)	-0.029	(0.093)
Education: University	0.007	(0.084)	-0.010	(0.085)	0.023	(0.087)	0.064	(0.085)	-0.063	(0.110)	0.019	(0.092)	-0.052	(0.110)	-0.080	(0.114)
Student	0.114	(0.135)	0.077	(0.136)	0.130	(0.138)	0.164	(0.136)	0.013	(0.177)	0.122	(0.144)	0.019	(0.177)	-0.061	(0.184)
Self employed	-0.099	(0.124)	-0.090	(0.125)	-0.097	(0.125)	-0.075	(0.125)	-0.160	(0.155)	-0.067	(0.133)	-0.149	(0.156)	-0.150	(0.158)
White-Collar Profess.	0.067	(0.083)	0.044	(0.084)	0.084	(0.084)	0.074	(0.083)	0.019	(0.110)	0.073	(0.089)	0.017	(0.110)	-0.005	(0.112)
House Person	0.120	(0.109)	0.136	(0.110)	0.122	(0.110)	0.113	(0.109)	0.047	(0.142)	0.184	(0.117)	0.041	(0.142)	0.044	(0.145)
Unemployed	-0.135	(0.103)	-0.083	(0.104)	-0.152	(0.104)	-0.139	(0.104)	-0.110	(0.144)	-0.125	(0.114)	-0.098	(0.144)	-0.087	(0.147)
Retired	-0.065	(0.093)	-0.048	(0.093)	-0.085	(0.095)	-0.065	(0.094)	-0.073	(0.122)	-0.034	(0.103)	-0.081	(0.122)	-0.062	(0.124)
Farmer/Fisherman	-0.538***	(0.194)	-0.478**	(0.194)	-0.575***	(0.198)	-0.537***	(0.194)	-0.735***	(0.256)	-0.560**	(0.224)	-0.733***	(0.256)	-0.722***	(0.260)
Income	0.059**	(0.029)	0.051*	(0.029)	0.063**	(0.030)	0.066**	(0.029)	0.039	(0.038)	0.058*	(0.032)	0.048	(0.038)	0.032	(0.039)
Survey CCEB	-0.790***	(0.266)	-0.127	(0.257)	-0.747***	(0.269)	-0.764***	(0.265)	-0.953***	(0.325)	-1.414***	(0.311)	-1.353***	(0.348)	0.153	(0.346)

Table 14 Continued

	H1		H2		H3		H4		H5		H6		H7		Full Model	
Denmark	-1.362***	(0.207)	-1.413***	(0.207)	-1.325***	(0.207)	-1.310***	(0.207)	-1.130***	(0.245)	-1.393***	(0.207)	-1.198***	(0.249)	-1.193***	(0.254)
West Germany	-0.397*	(0.212)	-0.370*	(0.212)	-0.415*	(0.214)	-0.305	(0.214)	-0.499*	(0.260)	-0.429**	(0.213)	-0.482*	(0.260)	-0.467*	(0.265)
Greece	0.141	(0.242)	0.154	(0.243)	0.152	(0.243)	0.222	(0.243)	0.351	(0.301)	0.086	(0.244)	0.260	(0.308)	0.304	(0.314)
Italy	-0.074	(0.247)	-0.113	(0.247)	-0.048	(0.247)	-0.020	(0.248)	0.501	(0.347)	-0.093	(0.247)	0.420	(0.349)	0.487	(0.353)
Spain	0.117	(0.267)	0.015	(0.267)	0.123	(0.267)	0.105	(0.267)	0.247	(0.333)	0.072	(0.268)	0.186	(0.3400	0.082	(0.342)
France	-0.440**	(0.214)	-0.475**	(0.2140	-0.423**	(0.214)	-0.433**	(0.214)	-0.549**	(0.263)	-0.442**	(0.214)	-0.630**	(0.266)	-0.645**	(0.268)
Ireland	-0.458	(0.329)	-0.548*	(0.3320	-0.461	(0.330)	-0.427	(0.331)	-0.560	(0.404)	-0.514	(0.330)	-0.666	(0.409)	-0.700*	(0.414)
Northern Ireland	-0.339	(0.349)	-0.454	(0.3470	-0.361	(0.349)	-0.293	(0.349)	~	~	-0.326	(0.348)	~	~	~	~
Luxembourg	-0.447	(0.315)	-0.496	(0.3160	-0.417	(0.320)	-0.398	(0.316)	~	~	-0.469	(0.316)	~	~	~	~
Holland	-0.248	(0.244)	-0.278	(0.244)	-0.257	(0.244)	-0.218	(0.244)	-0.077	(0.290)	-0.275	(0.244)	-0.125	(0.291)	-0.124	(0.295)
Portugal	0.607**	(0.266)	0.555**	(0.266)	0.598**	(0.267)	0.619**	(0.267)	0.471	(0.317)	0.553**	(0.267)	0.411	(0.324)	0.342	(0.330)
Great Britain	-1.078***	(0.217)	-1.163***	(0.218)	-1.083***	(0.217)	-1.053***	(0.217)	-0.838***	(0.258)	-1.119***	(0.218)	-1.135***	(0.264)	-1.058***	(0.272)
East Germany	0.119	(0.210)	0.142	(0.210)	0.133	(0.211)	0.230	(0.212)	~	~	0.109	(0.211)	~	~	~	~
Finland	-0.647***	(0.202)	-0.705***	(0.202)	-0.604***	(0.203)	-0.590***	(0.202)	-0.550**	(0.241)	-0.675***	(0.203)	-0.565**	(0.246)	-0.633**	(0.251)
Sweden	-1.545***	(0.200)	-1.641***	(0.200)	-1.538***	(0.200)	-1.500***	(0.200)	-1.266***	(0.240)	-1.579***	(0.200)	-1.400***	(0.244)	-1.408***	(0.250)
Austria	-0.781***	(0.206)	-0.789***	(0.207)	-0.743***	(0.211)	-0.683***	(0.207)	-0.696***	(0.248)	-0.791***	(0.207)	-0.699***	(0.248)	-0.680***	(0.255)
Bulgaria	1.416***	(0.287)	0.879***	(0.279)	1.371***	(0.290)	1.381***	(0.287)	1.502***	(0.386)	1.967***	(0.390)	2.327***	(0.404)	0.545	(0.422)
Cyprus	0.632**	(0.268)	0.030	(0.224)	0.591**	(0.270)	0.614**	(0.267)	1.178***	(0.349)	1.164***	(0.346)	1.081***	(0.351)	0.038	(0.314)
Czech Republic	0.604**	(0.234)	-0.185	(0.216)	0.563**	(0.237)	0.611***	(0.234)	1.055***	(0.296)	1.183***	(0.296)	1.373***	(0.313)	0.043	(0.299)
Estonia	0.449**	(0.225)	0.058	(0.232)	0.413*	(0.228)	0.474**	(0.225)	1.258***	(0.289)	1.143***	(0.283)	1.174***	(0.294)	-0.186	(0.321)
Hungary	0.646***	(0.242)	-0.347	(0.216)	0.610**	(0.245)	0.631***	(0.241)	1.014***	(0.316)	0.965***	(0.313)	0.946***	(0.331)	-0.609*	(0.314)
Latvia	0.292	(0.226)	0.083	(0.232)	0.274	(0.229)	0.306	(0.225)	0.508*	(0.286)	0.918***	(0.286)	0.940***	(0.307)	-0.275	(0.345)
Lithuania	0.686***	(0.242)	-0.659**	(0.269)	0.688***	(0.248)	0.680***	(0.242)	0.770**	(0.317)	1.214***	(0.320)	1.229***	(0.339)	-1.114***	(0.365)
Poland	0.530**	(0.236)	-0.024	(0.227)	0.545**	(0.240)	0.518**	(0.236)	0.719**	(0.317)	1.001***	(0.316)	1.154***	(0.340)	-0.249	(0.340)
Romania	1.237***	(0.328)	0.649**	(0.322)	1.248**	(0.335)	1.185***	(0.328)	1.655***	(0.462)	1.866***	(0.462)	1.999***	(0.477)	0.577	(0.479)
Slovakia	1.076***	(0.246)	0.562**	(0.238)	1.065***	(0.249)	1.099***	(0.246)	1.367***	(0.302)	1.529***	(0.304)	1.590***	(0.322)	0.422	(0.321)
Slovenia	1.422***	(0.258)	0.784***	(0.250)	1.406***	(0.260)	1.420***	(0.258)	1.733***	(0.357)	2.146***	(0.357)	2.191***	(0.376)	0.624	(0.381)
Turkey	0.130	(0.240)	-0.543**	(0.229)	0.131	(0.244)	0.139	(0.240)	0.052	(0.298)	0.480	(0.296)	0.505	(0.320)	-1.090***	(0.328)
Constant	1.635***	(0.291)	1.045***	(0.302)	1.710***	(0.294)	1.633***	(0.292)	1.501***	(0.374)	1.698***	(0.308)	0.770*	(0.394)	0.794*	(0.428)
Log likelihood	-16380.28		-15904.03		-15849.33		-16252.84		-9592.12		-13422.14		-9637.07		-9047.46	
Wald χ^2	2601.8***		3093.8***		2875.9**		2672.5***		1676.4***		2226.3**		1638.3***		2104.1***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0886		0.1129		0.1047		0.0915		0.1006		0.0929		0.0964		0.1401	
No. of observations	19166		19124		18927		19090		11769		15744		11769		11634	

Appendices

Appendix A: Variable Wording and Coding

Dependent Variable:

"Do you think that (Country)'s membership to the European Union is/would be 1. A Good thing, 2. Neither Good nor Bad, 3.A Bad thing.

Independent Variables:

Socio-Economic Variables

- **Gender:** 0=Male 1=Female
- **Married:** 0=Not Married (incorporating single/divorced), 1=Married/Remarried/Cohabitating
- **Age:** Age in years
- **Household Size:** Coded 1=1 person household, 2=2 person household, 3=3 person household 4=4 person household and 5=5 or more person household.
- **Education**: 1=primary, 2=Secondary, 3=University, 4=Still Studying
- **Occupation:** 1=Manual, 2=Self Employed, 3=White-collar professional, 4=House Person, 5=Unemployed, 6=Retired, 7=Farmer/Fisherman
- **Income:** CCEB-Deciles 1-10, EB- Quartile 1-4.

- **"Economic Winner"**

The Economic Winner variable is a combination of the following two questions:

Retrospective Question- *"If you compare your present situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, stayed the same, or got worse?"*

Prospective Question- *"In the course of the next five years, do you expect your personal situation to improve, to stay the same, or to get worse?"*

The mean of the 2 variables is taken and the results are recoded along a 0-1 continuum, where the higher value indicates an economic winners.

- **"Discuss Politics"**

"When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters, 1.Frequently, 2.Occasionally, 3.Never?"

- **"EU Knowledge"**

"On a scale of 1-10, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?"

1=Nothing at all and 10=Knows a great deal.

Political Motivation Variable

The 3 Political Motivation variables are all based on the following question *"If a General election were held tomorrow, which political party would you vote for?"*

- **"Party Alignment"**

EB "Eurosceptic Party": Each party in the EB 53 survey is coded as a Eurosceptic or Pro-EU party using the Marks/Steenbergen Experts Party Database. The variable is ordered on a scale of 1-7, whereby a party is coded 1 if it strongly opposes the EU and 7 if it strongly supports the EU. The variable is then transformed into a dichotomous variable in order to match the CEEB measure whereby parties are coded 0 if they are regarded as Pro-EU parties and 1 if they are perceived as Eurosceptic parties.

CCEB "Eurosceptic Party": Using several different sources (mainly, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) who classify all the main parties in 10 Central and East European countries into hard Eurosceptics and soft Eurosceptics) the Central and East European parties are coded 0 if they are regarded as Pro-EU parties and 1 if they are perceived as Eurosceptic parties.

- "**Incumbent Support":** This variable is coded 0 if the party favoured by the respondent is either in opposition or holds less than the majority of seats in the government, and 1 if the respondent favours the party which holds the majority of seats in government.

EB "Party Family": The Marks/Steenbergen dataset is used to classify each party into the following political family groups: 1.Socialists, 2.Conservatives, 3.Liberal, 4.Religious, 5.Radical Right, 6.Radical Left and 7.Others.

CCEB "Party Family": The Armingeon and Careja (2004)'s "Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries, 1989-2004", is used to categorised the parties into the following political family groups: 1.Socialists, 2.Conservatives, 3.Liberal, 4.Religious, 5.Radical Right, 6.Radical Left and 7.Others.

Appendix B

Table B.1 Marginal Effects of EB 53 MNL Full Model

Full Model	EU BAD	Neither Good or Bad	EU GOOD
Party: Conservative	0.013	-0.031	0.018
Party: Liberal	0.047	0.004	-0.050
Party: Religious	0.030	-0.030	0.001
Party: Radical Right	0.030	0.031	-0.061
Party: Radical Left	0.014	0.078	-0.092
Party: Other Family	0.020	0.004	-0.024
Incumbent Party	0.018	0.000	-0.018
Eurosceptic Party	0.197	0.016	-0.212
Knowledge of EU	-0.012	-0.025	0.037
Economic Winner	-0.140	-0.160	0.299
Female	0.011	0.033	-0.043
Married	0.004	-0.018	0.014
Age	0.004	-0.001	-0.003
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000
Household Size	0.008	0.002	-0.010
Education: Secondary	-0.003	-0.025	0.028
Education: University	-0.024	-0.090	0.114
Student	-0.032	-0.112	0.144
Self employed	0.014	-0.033	0.019
White-Collar Profess.	-0.025	-0.061	0.086
House Person	-0.010	-0.027	0.037
Unemployed	-0.005	-0.044	0.049
Retired	0.016	-0.026	0.010
Farmer/Fisherman	0.060	-0.075	0.016
Income	-0.021	-0.012	0.033
Denmark	0.218	-0.006	-0.212
West Germany	0.120	0.060	-0.180
Greece	-0.031	0.019	0.012
Italy	-0.035	0.065	-0.030
Spain	-0.018	-0.002	0.021
France	0.128	0.028	-0.156
Ireland	-0.020	-0.127	0.147
Holland	-0.031	-0.073	0.104
Portugal	-0.054	-0.029	0.083
Great Britain	0.272	0.093	-0.364
Finland	0.201	0.136	-0.337
Sweden	0.345	0.033	-0.378
Austria	0.219	0.117	-0.336

Table B.2 Marginal Effects of CEEB 2003.4 MNL Full Model

Full Model	EU BAD	Neither Good or Bad	EU GOOD
Party: Conservative	-0.048	-0.091	0.139
Party: Liberal	-0.024	-0.033	0.057
Party: Religious	-0.044	-0.118	0.161
Party: Radical Right	-0.026	-0.049	0.074
Party: Radical Left	0.188	0.089	-0.277
Party: Other Family	0.004	-0.006	0.002
Incumbent Party	-0.010	-0.039	0.049
Eurosceptic Party	0.074	0.099	-0.174
Knowledge of EU	-0.012	-0.038	0.050
Economic Winner	-0.139	-0.227	0.366
Female	-0.002	0.043	-0.042
Married	-0.002	0.007	-0.005
Age	-0.002	0.002	0.000
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000
Household Size	-0.004	0.005	-0.001
Education: Secondary	-0.006	0.001	0.005
Education: University	-0.017	-0.040	0.057
Student	-0.020	-0.009	0.029
Self employed	-0.004	-0.025	0.029
White-Collar Profess.	-0.012	-0.047	0.059
House Person	-0.008	-0.006	0.014
Unemployed	0.001	-0.009	0.009
Retired	-0.009	0.000	0.009
Farmer/Fisherman	0.017	-0.107	0.091
Income	0.002	-0.001	-0.002
Cyprus	0.351	0.114	-0.465
Czech Republic	0.233	0.206	-0.438
Estonia	0.428	0.170	-0.597
Hungary	0.300	0.032	-0.332
Latvia	0.520	0.091	-0.611
Lithuania	0.375	0.084	-0.459
Malta	0.586	-0.041	-0.545
Poland	0.399	0.087	-0.486
Romania	0.059	-0.054	-0.005
Slovakia	0.246	0.185	-0.431
Slovenia	0.251	0.291	-0.542
Turkey	0.472	-0.013	-0.460

Table B.3 Marginal Effects of EU-28 MNL Full Model

Full Model	EU BAD	Neither Good or Bad	EU GOOD
Party: Conservative	-0.037	-0.043	0.080
Party: Liberal	-0.022	-0.010	0.032
Party: Religious	-0.022	-0.049	0.071
Party: Radical Right	-0.018	0.010	0.008
Party: Radical Left	0.015	0.080	-0.094
Party: Other Family	-0.005	0.012	-0.008
Incumbent Party	-0.013	-0.018	0.031
Eurosceptic Party	0.117	0.055	-0.172
Knowledge of EU	-0.012	-0.032	0.044
Economic Winner	-0.150	-0.199	0.349
Female	0.004	0.036	-0.040
Married	-0.001	-0.007	0.007
Age	0.001	0.001	-0.001
Age Squared	0.000	0.000	0.000
Household Size	0.002	0.004	-0.005
Education: Secondary	-0.003	-0.014	0.018
Education: University	-0.021	-0.068	0.089
Student	-0.023	-0.067	0.090
Self employed	0.003	-0.026	0.023
White-Collar Profess.	-0.021	-0.052	0.073
House Person	-0.011	-0.016	0.027
Unemployed	-0.002	-0.025	0.027
Retired	0.001	-0.013	0.012
Farmer/Fisherman	0.024	-0.093	0.069
Income	-0.006	-0.008	0.014
CEEB Survey Dummy	-0.005	0.024	-0.019
Denmark	0.210	0.004	-0.215
West Germany	0.106	0.079	-0.185
Greece	-0.018	0.023	-0.005
Italy	-0.019	0.072	-0.053
Spain	-0.006	0.003	0.003
France	0.108	0.030	-0.138
Ireland	0.007	-0.112	0.105
Holland	-0.020	-0.072	0.093
Portugal	-0.034	-0.020	0.054
Great Britain	0.287	0.098	-0.386
Finland	0.190	0.149	-0.339
Sweden	0.344	0.047	-0.391
Austria	0.205	0.147	-0.352
Bulgaria	-0.074	-0.131	0.205
Cyprus	0.011	0.038	-0.049
Czech Republic	0.051	0.140	-0.190
Estonia	-0.019	-0.080	0.100
Hungary	0.130	0.071	-0.201
Latvia	0.025	-0.010	-0.015
Lithuania	0.093	-0.083	-0.010
Poland	0.029	0.005	-0.034
Romania	-0.087	-0.177	0.264
Slovakia	-0.026	0.028	-0.003
Slovenia	-0.007	0.167	-0.160
Turkey	0.073	-0.097	0.024

Appendix C

Hausman and Small-Hsiao Tests of IIA Assumption

Survey	Categories	Hausman Test		Small-Hsiao Test	
		χ^2(df)	Result	χ^2(df)	Result
EB 53	EU Neither Good nor Bad	-56.47(38)	For Ho	46.20(39)	For Ho
	EU Good	-5.039(38)	For Ho	32.41(39)	For Ho
CCEB	EU Neither Good nor Bad	-25.95(37)	For Ho	46.87(38)	For Ho
	EU Good	-11.64(37)	For Ho	37.12(38)	For Ho
EU 25	EU Neither Good nor Bad	-7.79(51)	For Ho	51.51(52)	For Ho
	EU Good	-13.61(51)	For Ho	50.38(52)	For Ho

Note: Ho: Odds are independent of other alternatives